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During the latter part of the nineteent.h century I
'Oe:;ln po't'lers acquired large t:erri t.orial areas in .l\.f rica.

Euro-.
'l'hese

territories ignored the boundaries of old l..frican tri'bal king
doms and the African modes of life, bf;cause t.;.he new cou.ntries
were to serve as • COmll\On market t areas suppl!l"ing Europe wi t.h

the wealth of the tropics.

Nigeria it. an eX.::lmple of the new

supcrst.:ruct.ur0. ,,;hich in op?rat.ion fulls tc; become a
ent~_ty

'l."here

after the assumpt.io::: of political Po",,'cr by
c,,:rA

problmns of exi.st in,; trj.bal

kin;dom~,

h~.)mogeneou5

tht'~

Africans.

of c;eogrctphic

2
distribution of ethnic groups and of traditional values.

The

British colonization of Nigeria also brought about regional
distribution of Western ideas and differing attitudes among
Nigerians.

The problems, politically, sociologically and

economically, are imbedded in present day Nigerian society.
The British attempt to build Nigeria as an economic area has
produced certain centripetal forces which are revealed in the
growth of urbanization with resulting detribalization, means
of communication with the concomitant social mobility, and
the educational facilities with its new breed of Nigerians.
The building of national consciousness and political stability
are faced with centrifugal forces which are really problems of
change introduced by the Europeans and accepted by the Africans.
At the same time, the forces of change are challenged by tra
ditional factors which still weigh on the Nigerian mind.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the study is to analyse the problems
of national unity in one of the African countries and see

whether such problems must be attributed to the European
Powers which partitioned Africa.

The st.udy is not a vindi

cation of colonial rule, but presents a critical viewpoint
as far as those problems are concerned •
. Nigeria will serve as the country under study.

It is

selected because it contains the largest concentratiOn of
black Africans who might be assumed to be homogeneous.

More

over, immediately after independEmce Nigeria was labelled by
the Western nations as a bastion of democracy.

Its mere size

creates problems as far as national unity is concerned.

In

addition to this, the civil war in Nigeria and the reaction of
the African heads of state and other world leaders afford a
very suitable occasion to examine the problems of national
unity.

•I

Mention

mus~.also

be made of ariother factor which in

duced me to pick Nigeria.

As a Nigerian I have seen a little

bi t of lhe tt170 worlds--the colonial era and the independence
period of the country.

1'.5

a resident of a coalesced community-

three villages of about twenty thousand or more people who claim

2

a common descent and mores, and live under one group head as
their secular leader--I could observe some of the problems at
the local level.

~\nd

as an elected representative of this

cOIDnlunity in a county council which was formed by joining two
county councils, or rather two clans--Ibesikpo and Asutan--I
wi trlessea some of the problems of unity at the grass roots.
Political though such experience may be, it provided strong
evidence for the 'play it cool' attitude of the traditional
members in matters of

unity~

It also afforded evidence

against the former civilian regional government in non-govern
ment party areas, their allocation of amenities, and their
role on minority issues.
Materials for this study are based on documentary
evidence which include journals, case studies of Nigeria in
general, and my personal experience as a Nigerian.

Although

red tape has forestalled the gathering of opinions from some
Africans, especially the Nigerian leaders, a number of Nigerians
and other African students have freely expressed their opinions
about European powers and national unity in Afri.ca.

All the
I

sam~~,

various Africans in public life have wri tt:en books re
1

Obafemi Awolo'vo, Path to Nigerian Freedom. London,
Faber, 1947.
Nnamdi. Azik:i.tlle I Poli ticaJ. Blue_print of ~iSI.E...f.ia. Lagos I
1943.
T. Ola',lale Elias, Q. C., Government and Politics in Ni
seria. Net-l York, 1963.
K'-lame Nkrumah, P.frica Uust unite. F .A. PrCleger I New
York, 1963.

Tom Hboya, F;-eedom and Af1:;er. I,i ttle Brown and Co.,
Boston, 1963.

3

lated to this subject, and their
this paper were consulted.

O\ffl

opinions pertinent to

But the opinions of these African

writers do not affect my own conclusions since I am trying to
present a critical point of view of the national problems.
The attempt of \V'ri ting either African history or presenting
African problems with sympathy is much reduced.
In addition to the basic source materials there were
other isolated parts gathered from some newspapers and maga
zines.

An extensive bibliography has been added at the close

of the thesis.

African oral history, although it could not

be documented, has helped in forming some opinions; and I
would like to credit my late uncle, Chief Abakada (Bassey)
Ituen, a traditional ruler, a sptritual leader and great oral
historian of the Ibesikpo clan who was consulted by the British
administrators during the era of clan and division formation.

j

I

CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Africa is labelled as the Da.l.-k Continent.

The phrase

itself suggests that Africa was a backwater a.rea of Western
European penetration.

Interestingly enough, the Romans had

colonized a greater part of North Africa though not beyond
the Sahara.

The Arabs through Islam and the caravan trade

had penetrated much of Africa.

Not even the Sahara was a

barrier for Morocco and Tripoli, the caravan trading centers
on North Africa, were connected with the trading centers of
the Western Sudan such as Timbuktu and Kano in what are now
Mali and Nigeria respectively.

The Red Sea trade, on the othe=

hand, brought Arabic-speaking peoples into East and Central
Africa.

If the Ottoman Empire is regarded as a part of the

Eastern European affairs, this empire had dependencies in Egypt,
Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers.

South Africa also experienced the

East. African influence of the 1>.rab tradersi such influence I.<las
very minimal.

The sea voyage of Vasco da Gama, a Portuguese,

with his successful rounding of the Cape of Good Hope in 1498
opened South Africa to European eyesi however, it was 1652 be
fore a group of Dutch settlers planted a colony at Cape Town.
In spite of such western European settlement, lnllch of Africa
was a trading domain for the Moslem Arab traders.

But at the

5

same time, some western European nations were coming in contact
with some of the coastal city-states of certain areas of Africa.
The Portuguese were the first western European nation to
reach the Guinea coast of the Western Sudan, and to land their
1

first crews in Benin in 1472.

Benin was not only a prosperous

commercial center, but also a powerful kingdom in the forest
land of the Guinea Coast.

The Portuguese through Alfonso

d'Aveiro opened the first diplomatic relations with the ruler
of Benin in 1485.
trade of Benin.

Thus the Port.uguese contact expanded the
The Benin trade on the forest products such

as peppers and ivory soon was opened to another western Europecnn
nation.

In 1553 a British sea captain, Winham, 'made the first

English voyage to Guinea and Benin.

The English expedition

into Benin did not only expand the Benin trade but it also up
set the tone of the Portuguese trade; for the English traders
became interested in the local slave trade, and thus gave it
a new impetus.

Between 1600 and 1800 western European nations

became interested in geographical exploration of Africa.

In

1796 Mungo Park and other Englishmen arrived at the Guinea
Coast to trace the source and the course of the river Niger.
In 1823 Clapperton and his crew arrived at Kuka in Bornu, Kano
in Hausaland, and Sakoto in the Fulani empire.

Richard Lander

1

Benin is now the capitol of the Midwest State in Nigeria.
The state is mainly inhabited by the Edos, the Urabos, the
western Ibos, and the western Ijaws.

6

wit:';. his team reached Brass 3.t the mouth of the ihg0r in 1830.
D2.',id Li vi7lgs tone led an expedition in 185 3

~long

tbe Za.r[;bc.zi

river; while Sir Richard Burton in 1850 explored lake Tan··
ganyika on the East Coast of Africa.

Bety.reen 1858 and 1862

Captain Speke explored the lacustrine region of Uganda.
1877 R.M. Stanley, lilho was

lat~r

In

employed :in the services of

King Leopuld II of Belgium, surveyed milch of the Congo basin;
but the exploration of the Congo region soon attracted Sa·
vorgnan de Brazza of FranC8.

By means of trade and geo

graphical exploration Western European nations penetrated into
Africa, and later laid claims to certain African territories.
Even though the Portuguese were the first European nation
to arrive in ·the Benin Kingdom, the area of what is now terr::l.ed
Nigeria was largely influenced by the British.

In 1833, the

slave trade was abolished and the British turned their attention
to promoting legitimate trade along the Guinea Coast.

In 1849

the British established their first consulate at Calabar.

To

suppress the slave trade, the British consulate found it
necessary in 1861 to attach and colonize Lagos, then a major
slave-dealing center.

British influence was thus established

at Lagos colony and the adjacent areas.

The establishment of

the colony of rJagos was the first direct involvement by the
British government, and the citizens of Lagos were regarded as
British subjects.

Calabar, the consulate headquarters, served

as a stepping stone to the creat.ion of the Oil Rivers Protect

7
orate or the Niger Coast Protectorate which was proclaimed on
June 5, 1885.

The Niger Coast Protectorate was only a trading

area open to many European firms; but this area was directly
influenced by the Consulate.

The inhabitants of this Oil

Rivers Protectorate, quite unlike those of Lagos, were re
garded as British protected persons.
The amalgamation of the various trading firms on the
Niger by Sir Taubman Goldie, and the granting of a charter to
the company so formed allowed the Royal Niger Company to rule
from 1886 until December 1899 in territories with which the
2
agents of the company had signed treaties. The company's
territory expanded along an ever-moving frontier as its agents
moved inland.

In theory it extended as far as Katsina and

Bornu in Northern Nigeria; and in the southwest it covered
3

New Calabar, Brass and parts of the present Midwest State;
and to the southeast it extended to Old Calabar, the consulate
headquarters.

Treaties were signed to claim areas of influ

ence on the parts of the chiefs, but the territorial area of
the chief was limited according to his ability.

If he was a

wealthy and powerful chief it may take in pockets and hamlets
2

The treaties as understood by the chiefs and the people
of the area were not a political hand-over of their territories
but they were to allow a peaceful penetration of the company's
merchants.
3

This is Bonny area along the Bight of Biafra.

B

4
of his in-laws.

The company's territorial area was a trade

area, nay, a service area.

To stabilize its spheres of influ

ence the Royal Niger Company set up a military headquarters at
Lokoja, a town at the confluence of the Niger and the Benue.
The stationing of troops in Northern Nigeria helped in the
pacification of the Fulani emirates.

The company also estab

1ished another headquarters at Asaba on the Niger delta to
undertake both ruling and trading responsibilities.

Bebleen

1897 and 1898 the Royal Niger Company broke its clauses of

the charter by monopolizing t.he trade I and had to fight the
angry Asaba b:aders who burnt t.heir heo.dql1arters.

The charter

was therefore revoked very reluctantly by Her Majesty's
Government, for many British taxpayers cUd not \vant to assume
the increased financial burden of administering the colonies.
Furthermore, many of them believed that the desire far colonies
had been the cause of most of the wars during- the earlier
hundred and sixty years.

It was in 1900 when the British

Government took over the control of the Colony of Lagos, the
Niger Coast Protectorate and the Royal Niger Company's terri
tory, and christened the new protectorate, Nigeria, a name
5

which first appeared in The Times, the British government as
such now became directly involved \\Tith the administration of
Nigeria.

The new country was divided into three administrative

4

A chief may marry more than one \1ife, and aU. the wives
do not come from one village.
5

Federal Hinistry of Information, Nigeria 196~A ~p~.cia~
Independence Issue of Nigeria Magazine, October 1960, U'ederal
Government Printer, Lagos, Nigeria, 1960) p.9.

9

units:

the Colony of Lagos, the Protectorate of Southern Ni

geria, and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria.

The new

administrative divisions involved major adjustments in the
former territories of the Oil Rivers Protectorate and the
Royal Niger Company.

It must be emphasized that the ground

work for the acquisition of territories had been laid by the
British firms which by various means bought off other nonBritish firms.

The British government was only taking up

trade areas of their firms; and although there was fighting
in Northern Nigeria from 1900 to 1906, it was the result of
the pacification program, and the establishment of the British
government's influence.
By 1906 the Colony of Lagos which was separately ad
ministered was unified with the Protectorate of Southern
Nigeria.

Even though the Colony of Lagos was brought under

the administration of the Southern Protectorate for a period
of forty-five years (186l-1906), the separate identity of
Lagos had been a reality, particularly in outlook and insti
tutions.

In 1914, the Colony and the Southern Protectorate,

and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria were amalgamated
under one governor-general, but were not uniformly administered.
The amalgamation caused many administrative problems, some no
doubt can be attributable to how Great Britain and other Euro
pean nations reacted to the assassination of Francis Ferdinand
rather than to the uncongenial climate of Nigeria.

There was

/

a general lack of British staff to run the country; and the
territory was very large.

In addition there was the problem

10
of getting enough money for the administration.

Thus a unified

Nigeria \-las born in the year when British finance and manpmver
were strained by the First

~vor1d

War.

Lord Lugard, who had served the Royal Niger Company as an
6

agent, became the first British Governor-general in the amal
gamated protectorates.

Lord Lugard, therefore, resorted to a
7
system of Indirect Rule which entrenched and stabilized auto
cratic and conservative emirs who supported British interest.
It is true that Indirect Rule recognized the importance of
indigenous administration and furthermore reduced the high
cost of bureaucracy, but Lord Lugard was disdainful of the few
educated Nigerians since he felt they had nothing in common

with the masses.

Most of the Nigerian. elite were not members

of the royal families to be appointed as chiefs and emirsi and
as such they were denied an opportunity of laying the
trative foundation of a unified Nigeria.

ad~inis-

The Nigerian

bourgeoisie saw indirect rule as presenting a division between
the new breed and t.he traditional rulers.

Indirect rule per

petuated the traditional political units of varying sizes in
. which clannish attitudes and loyalt.ies had their roots.

Aside

6

In 1894 Lugard rushed to Borgu and made a treaty with
the chiefs to prevent the French from acquiring all of Kiama
and Nikki territory into Dahomey.
7
T. Olawake Elias, Q.C., Government and Politics in Africa,
(New York: Asia Publishing House, 1963), p. 24. See a~so Lora-
Arthur Lugard, The Dual Mandate in Tropical Afric~, (London,1922).

-----------

----

---

-

11

from Northern Nigeria, Yorubaland and. Bini alTa, there were no
large scale political organizations, consequently most Nigerians,
8

especially those from the South, lacked adndnistrative experi
ence for running a large political unit.

The we.aknesses of

Lord Lugard's system notwithstanding, indirect rule aimed at
sta.bility of the Nigerian society and securing law and order
which would foster British economic interests.

Apart from a

few incidents--the Aba riot of 1929 in which women opposed
general taxes; the shooting of Enugu coal mine strikers de
manding fair wages in 1949, and the Kano riot of 1953 in which
the Northerners fought the Southerners--indirect rule ushered
in the Pax Britannica.

The system became a model for British

colonial government in East Africa.
The disdainful attitude of Lord Lugard to the Nigerian
9

intelligentsia became the hallmark of Colonial administration.
I

From 1923 to 1945 the Nigerian Legislative Council excluded
many educated Nigerians from the administrative and policy
making arms of the government.

Only four Africans represented

the Southern Protectorate while the North had no African
representation.

Three members represented the township of Lagos,

8

Indirect rule was first introduced into Northern Nigeria
where the emirs ruled large emirates before the advent of the
British. In the South the areas ruled by the chiefs were small
and at times not larger than the village.
I.
9

Report on the Administration of Southern an . Northern
Nigeria, and l~dministration, 1912-1919. Cmd. 4681Longon: .
H.M.S.O., 1920) p. 19.
.
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while one African represented 'Calabar township.
appointed members were not native Nigerians:

Most of these

Chief O'Dwyer,

who represented Calabar, was from Ghana; Sir Adeyemo Alakija
came from Brazil and Justice S.B. Rhodes was a Sierra Leonian.
Although Northern and Southern Nigeria were amalgamated, the
Legislative Council failed to have African representation for
the North and left Northern legislation in the hands of the
British Commissioner.
The French, on the other hand, with their policy of
cultural assimilation and direct colonial administration,
absorbed most of the educated Africans.

Leopold Senghor and

Houphouet Boigny became members in the Chamber of Deputies.
The French regarded the Africans as citizens of France and
made the colonies as French provinces.

Thus, the French

transferred the African problems to metropolitan France, but
the granting of independence to the former French colonies and
the problems came back to those African territories.

The civil

war to suppress secession in Chad, the series of coup d'etats

in Togo and Dahomey for example, failed to credit French
acculturization.
In 1945 Sir Arthur Richards' Constitution balkanized the

Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria into three regions:
East and West.

North,

It set up Houses of Assembly with advisory

powers in each of these regions.

The Constitution also estab

lished a Legislative Council for all the regions.

This was

13
really the first time that the two Southern regions were brought
together with the North.

The Richards Constitution was seri

ously criticized by the Nigerian intelligentsia who maintained
that their own opinion was overridden by the British Consti
tution makers.

In 1950 at Ibadan a Constitutional Conference

of representatives from all sections of Nigeria was held to
review the Richards Constitution.

The resulting 1951 Revised

Constitution created a central council of ministers and a House
of Representatives for the whole country.

It also provided for

Regional Houses of Assembly and Houses of Chiefs in Northern
and Western Nigeria.

lived.

But the Revised Constitution was short

In 1953 in the House of Representatives at Lagos Chief

Anthony Enahoro presented a motion that, the House accept the
attainment of self-government for Nigeria in 1956.

Alhaji

Ahmadu, Sardauna of Sokoto and leader of the Northern Peoples'
Congress, moved the adoption of an amendment to change the
fixed date to

I

as soon as practicable I

amendment resulted.

•

Bitter debate on t.he

Members of the National Council of Nigerian

Citizens and the Action Group Party walked out of the House.
The members of the Northern Peoples' Congress were criticized
and ridiculed as imperialistic stooges.

On their return to

the North they determined never again to be subjected to the
Southern indignities; and they issued a statement of secession
of the region from Nigeria.
Chief S .L. Akintola of the

At the height of this tension,
P~ction

Group scheduled a tour of the

14
North to campaign for self-government in 1956.

This led to four

days of rioting in Kano in which about twenty-one Southerners
and fifteen Northerners "Vlere killed.

To forestall the Northern

secession and to ease the North-South tension, a new consti
tutional conference held in London in 1953 decided that further
discussions in Nigeria were necessary.

In 1954 the meetings

of the Constitutional Cor:ference resumeu at Lagos.

The result-·

ing constitutional document provided for direct elections to
the House of Representatives.

The regional legislatures were

given increased autonomy and responsibility for specific
matters.

The granting of autonomy to the regions was a major

turning point.

It recognized that Nigeria could not be ruled

under a single, centralized form of government, and that the
amalgamation of 1914 as symbolized in the appointment of a
single governor-general had been carried out for financial and
economic reasons.

In 1954 the only symbols of unity were the

House of Representatives and the governor-general.
The
10
Macpherson Constitution of 1954 decentralized political power
. in the country and accepted the fact that real diversities
existed in Nigeria.

The politicians in the country accepted

the Constitution and they acknowledged the differences in Ni
geria.
10

John Stuart Macpherson was the governor-general of
Nigeria (April 14, 1948-mid-1955) under whose chairmanship
the constitution was written.

15
The autonomous powers of the regional legislat.ures went
into effect in 1957 when Eastern and Western Nigeria attained
internal self-government.

For two years the giant Northern

Nigeria refused to follow this course because its leaders com
plained that there vlere inadequately trained men in its key
administrative posts.

In the northern and southern Cameroons,

the former German colony given to Great Britain as a mandate
and administered as part of Nigeria, there was some apprehen
sion.

The north, which was administered as a part of Northern

Nigeria, decided to remain within Northern Nigeria, while the
southern Cameroons, which was part ,of the Eastern region,
accepted a quasi-territorial status and made plans for its
independence outside the framework of Nigeria.

In spite of its

association with Nigeria from 1916 to 1958, the Southern
Cameroons preferred to unite in 1961 with the former French
mandated Cameroons, which gained independence in 1960.

On

October 1, 1960 the self-governing regions of the North, East.,
and West formed a federation.

They adopted a national anthem

symbolizing their common brotherhood.

The Federation of Ni

geria undertook a population census on May 13, 1962.

The East

had an average increase of 71 percent, although five of its
census divisions had increases changing from 120 percent to
200 percent.

The West showed a rise of over 70 percent, while

the North had an increase of 30 percent.

The Chief Census

Officer, Mr. Warren, dismissed these figures as too exaggerated.

16
Before the census, there had been an active political campaign
to register a substantial population since the number of repre
sentatives from each region to the Federal House of Represent
atives was to be based on the census.

Surprisingly enough,

during the population count the Eastern Regional Government
announced the discovery of villages in Eket and Ibeno areas
whose population had never been counted during the census of
1952.

Other regions had justifiable misgivings that the census

figures had been inflated.

On November 5, 1963 another census

was taken under tense conditions and regional mistrust.

While

the census controversy was prevailing, an election to the Fed
era1 House of Representatives was held on December 30, 1964.
11
The united Progressive Grand Alliance with its core areas in
the Eastern Region and Midwest boycotted this election on the
grounds that many candidates were returned unopposed in the
North.

The resultant controversy precipitated a crisis in

which the president of the country hesitated before announcing
the appointment of the prime minister.

The leader of the United

11

To prepare for t~e 1964 election the political parties
in Nigeria reorganized by forming alliances. The United Pro
gressive Grand Alliance comprises the National Council of
Nigeria Citizens, which was the governing party in the East
and the Midwest; the Northern Elements Progressive Union, which
was the opposition party in the' North; the United Middle Belt.
Congress was also an opposition party in the Northi and the
Action Group, a governing party in the West until 1962 and an
opposition party in the Federal House till 1965 •
./

17
Progressive Grand Alliance, Dr. Nichael Okpara, felt that the
Northern Peoples' Congress--the ruling party in the North and
in the Federation--had undermined the unity of the country in
many ways.
Between 1962 and 1965 events in Western Nigeria under
mined the common brotherhood of the Federation.

Western Ni

geria faced an intrat.cibal struggle of leadership and party
12
conflict. Chief Obafemi Awolowo, founder and party leader of
13
the Action Group, and Em opposi tion leader in the Federal Hous'e,
dismissed his deputy Chief S.!•• Akintola, premier of Western
Nigeria for his failure to carry out pa:rty pOlicies in his
regional government.

Chief Akintola and his supporters chose

to form a new splinter party, the Nigerian National Democratic
Party.

At the same time" Chief Akintola refused to resign as

the premier of the West on the grounds that he could only be
dismissed from the premiership by a censure motion in the
Western House of Assembly and the House of Chiefs.

An attempt

to move a censure motion in the Western House of Assembly
12
Chief Awolowo was the premier of Western Nigeria until
1959 when he joined the Federal House to lead the opposition;
and Chief Akintola was appointed to lead the regional govern
ment.
13

The Action Group was a ruling party in the West, 1951
62, in opposition in the East, the Midwest 1951-62, and in the
Federal House 1959-64.

18

triggered a fight on the floor of the House.

'l.'he Federal Gov

14

ernment declared a state of emergency in the region and ap
pointed an administrator, Dr. Moses Majakodemi.

At this time

. a plot to overthrow the Federal Government was discovered;
and Chief Awolowo, Joseph Tarka, who was the leader of the
united Middle Belt Congress and other prominent members of the
Action· Group and its allies were accused of treasonable felony,
and they were later jailed.
returned to the West.

Conditions of apparent normalcy

Chief Akintola took the reins of govern

ment without any election to test his popularity since the
normal term of the vlestern House had not run out.

The governor

of the region, Sir Adesiji Aderemi, who had not supported
Akintola, was

remov~d

from office, and a new man was installed.

On both regional and

natio~al

levels the whole of 1965

was a power struggle in Nigeria among the political parties.
The Western House of Assembly was dissolved in 1965.

Chief

Akintola, with his party, formed an alliance with the Northern
Peoples' Congress, while the Action Group allied itself with
the National Council of Nigerian Citizens.
tension grew to a fever pitch.

During the election

Balloting results showed Chief

Akintola as the winner, but his party was immediately charged
with rigging the election.

The leader of the Action Group

14

The Federal Government was run by a coalition of two
parties: the Northern Peoples' Congress which ruled in the
North, and the National Council of Nigerian Citizens which
ruled in the East and ~h the Midwest.
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Alliance, Alhaji Adegbenro, occupied the State House only to
be removed by the police.

The loss of life and property in

the rioting which followed the election was unprecedented, yet
the Federal Government refused to intervene in the internal
affairs of Western Nigeria.
The boycott of the national election by the united Pro
gressive Grand Alliance and the election crisis in the West
precipitated yet another crisis.

This crisis seems to indicate

that some elements in Nigeria had lost faith with the ruling
elite in the country.

On January 15, 1966, a group of young

army officers staged a revolution.

The premier of the North

and leader of the Northern Peoples' Congress, Sir Ahmadu Bello,
his deputy and prime minister of Nigeria, Sir Tafewa Belewa,
the premier of Western Nigeria and leader of the Nigerian
National Democratic Party, Chief S.L. Akintola, and the Fed
eral'Minister of Finance Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh were all
assassinated.

Nevertheless, the military spared some leading

political figures from the purge--for example, the president
of the Senate and acting president of the country, Dr. Nwafor
Orizu, the premier of Eastern Nigeria and leader of the United
Progressive Grand Alliance, Dr. Michael Okpara, and Chief
Dennis Osadebay, the premier of the Hidwest.

Since Dr. Nnamdi

Azikiwe, the President of the country was away on sick leave,
the acting President, who was the highest ranking civilian
official, presumably intimidated by the military coup, failed
..'
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to appoint an acting Prime Minister.

The Federal Parliament

was still in session, and it too, through the Cabinet, failed
to appoint a civilian leader.

Perhaps out of fear or for po

litical reasons, the Federal Cabinet, presided over by Alhaji
Zanna Bukar Dipcharima, decided to hand over the government
to the army and the police.

With the Acting President's

announcement of this decision to the nation, the military coup
d'etat successfully removed the civilian government and sus
pended the operating framework of British democracy.
The Supreme Commander of the Nigerian Armed Forces,
Major-General Ironsi assumed control of government and sus
pended the Civil Constitution.

~yhis

own instrument of power,

he annulled the federal structure and instituted a unitary
form of government such as the civilians had tried with the
1951 Revised Constitution.

The Unification Decree Number 34,

which was issued on May 24, 1966 caused a reaction in the North
where fear of Southern domination was strong.

On May 29, 1966,

some Northerners took to violence.

Some Southerners were mur
15
dered, especially people from the East who lived in Sabon-Gari.
Escapees fled to their homelands.

This violence against the

Easterners was probably due to the fact that Major-General
15
On the fringes of northern cities there are strangers'
quarters; and the largest Sabon-Gari is in Kano.

21
Ironsi and most of his advisers came from the East.

It can also

be regarded as a reaction against the assassination of their
tribal leaders.

The North always had been a barometer indi

cating the tempo of the country's socio-political progress and
the violence there was probably an attempt to th\';1art the Major
General's plans for a unitary state.
As if the violence of some Northerners was not enough to
forestall the newly announced program of t.he Major-General, on
July 29, 1966 certain elements in the army undertook a coup
d'etat.

Major-General Ironsi, and the military governor of

the West, Lieut.-Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi were murdered at Ibadan.
On August 1, 1966 Lieut.-Colonel Yakubu Gowon from the Middle
Belt in the North assumed the supreme command of the Nigerian
Armed Forces and became head of t:-he Federal Military govern
ment.

Within the Nigerian army itself there was no unity; and

it faced both a leadership struggle and the delicate task of
determining the type of government by which the country was to
be ruled.

The head of the Federal Military Government, Major

General Yakubu Gowon, restored the federal structure of govern
ment.

Furthermore, he re+eased from prison Chiefs Obafemi

Awolowo, Anthony Enahoro, Efiong Okon Eyo and other politicians
who had been jailed for treasonable felony and conspiracy by
the earlier civilian government.
The lack of unity in the army became increasingly obvious
when the military governor of the East, Lieut.-Colonel Chuk
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wuemeka Ojukwu wanted a type of government that would provide
greater security and protection to the life and property of the
Easterners.

The May violence in the North and the July coup

within the Nigerian army caused him to believe that the Federal
Military Government, as constituted, was incapable of protect
ing the people of the East.

He felt, perhaps, that the East

was a homogeneous state whose cause he could champion and thus
determine its own destiny.

He ordered all Easterners 'Vlho were

residing in other parts of the country to return to the East.
The East gained in population but in doing so put great
16
pr;essure on its limited £pace and economy_ On May 27, 1967
the Federal Military Government created twelve states, three
17
of which were carved from the Eastern region. The long sought
for objective of minorities in the country was thus realized.
Lieut.-Colonel Ojukwu was thus denied the leadership of the
whole East.

Committed to the principle that the East was a

homogeneous unit and insisting on championing its self-determi
nation regardless of the minorities' feelings, Lieut.-Colonel
16
The landspace of the East was 29,484 square miles with
a population of 12.4 million; and the more fertile areas are
the fringes toward the southeast. Toward the southwest fringe
are the creeks and oil wells. On the northern fringe is the
coal field. The oil wells and the coal field"are Federal
Government property leased to companies and corporations.
17

The three states are the East Central, the Rivers, and
the South-Eastern.
/
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Ojukwu declared his territory the Republic of Biafra and all
nounced its secession from the Federal Republic of Nigeria on
May 30, 1967.

On July 7, 1967 the Federal troops invaded Bi

afra, concentrating their attention to the minority areas-
the Rivers and the South-Eastern States--which fell to the
Federal forces during the early part of the Civil War.

There

was no doubt that some minorities supported Bi.afra, but it is
clear that a great many of them rallied around the Federal
Military Government.

Self-determination of the minorities was

a basic principle within the federation and this was granted
them.

The former civili.an government had ignored the claims
18

of the minorities.
During the early part of the Civil War the Biafran forces
undertook an expansionist strategy instead of defending the
territorial area of the former Eastern region.

Between August

and. September 1967 the battle moved into the Midwest region
which had been carved out of the Western region in 1963.

The

Biafran forces occupied the Midwest and declared it the Repub
lic of Benin, but towards the end of September, the over-ex
tended Biafran troops

wer~

chased out of the Republic of Benin.

The occupation of the Midwest probably was undertaken in part
18

In 1958 the Willink Commission set up solely for mi
nority affairs reported that the fears of minorities exist in
Nigeria, but it refused the creation of more states and, rather,
recommended the Rivers area as a specialized region for develop
ment by the Federal Government.
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because Ojukwu wanted to offer protection and security to the
Western Ibos--some members of Ojukwu's ethnic group who were
cut off from those of the Eastern Region--and partly because
the oil wealth of the Midwest would supply badly needed revenue
for the war efforts.

In time economic blockade and loss of food producing
areas produced increasing starvation among the Biafrans.

With

the aid of an obliging foreign press Hajor-General Ojukwu
aroused the conscience of the world.

This support helped keep

Biafra alive and thus sustained the war for over two years.
The Republic of Biafra gained international recognition from
Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Haiti.

The recogni

tion of Biafra was done either to put pressure on the Federal
19
Military Government to accept peace moves, or to give moral
support to the besieged Biafra and thus embarrass the Federal
Military Government.
end the conflict.

But all peace mediation efforts failed to

Major-General Ojukwuwon the propaganda war

fare part:icularly by his charge of "genocide", but the Federal
forces ultimately had their victory on the battlefield.

On

January 11, 1970 General Ojukwu fled Biafra; he left the leader
ship to Major-General Philip Effiong, the Chief of the General
Staff, who capitulated on January 15, 1970.
19

After thirty months

There were peace talks at Niamoey in Niger, Kampala in
Uganda, and Addis Ababa in Ethiopia. There were also peace
moves by the Commonwealth Secretary and by the Organization of
African Unity.
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the biafranization of Nigeria came to a tragic end.

Even though

fighting for self-determination is at present going on in Chad
and in the Sudan, the collapse of Biafra suggests that such ef
forts are doomed to little success in this era.

'l'he support· of

20

members of the Organization of African Unity for a united Nigeria
portrays that the majority of the African nations do not wish the
readjustment of the artificial boundaries of their countries.

20

Tanzania, Gabon, Zambia and Ivory Coast, all members
of the O.A.U., supported Biafra. But it is doubtful if they
would support balkanization of their own c9untries.

CHAPTER III
THE PROBLEMS 01:" UNITY
In the context of the foregoing discussion, we must ex
amine the powerful cent.rifugal forces at \,lork in Nigeria and
consider to what extent they are due to the actions of Great
Britain as the colonizing power.

From its inception, Nigeria

was arbitrarily carved out from the various existing empires,
1

states and kingdoms.

Part of the great empire of Kanem-Bornu

was within the present borders of Nigeria.

It also extended

into present Niger and Chad, both formerly r'rench colonies.
2

The Fulani empire, which also extended into Niger, ruled most
of the cattle and grain raising lands of the North before its
conquest in 1906 by the British government.

The subjec'cs of

Kanem-Bornu empire recognized EI-Kanemi or the Shehu of Bornu
as their leader; while in the Fulani empire the Sultan of So
koto was regarded as the overlord.

Within both of these em

pires lesser lords--emirs":-ruled in each of the emirates.
1

Kanem was east of Lake Chad \,lhile Bornu was west of the
lake. The empire was built around the lake; and it might have
shifted its capitol in course of time.
2

The Fulani empire was originally the 14 Hansa states
which were later conquered by the l:"ulani who became the over
lords.
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These two empires covered much of the grassland and semi-desert
of Northern Nigeria.

From their topographical condition, roll

ing plain, these empires had every reason to cover an extensive
area.

The peoples of these empires took to cattle raising.,

moving from pasture to pasture.
practiced by the Cow Fulani.

This nomadic life is still

Aside from cattle herding they

undertook caravan trade in salt and leather.

Thus, to all in

tents and purposes most. of the people were nomads; and their
empire and jurisdiction of their ruler had taken into account
the conditions of nomadic life.

In addition, there were those

people who settled in towns such as the Settled Fulani.

Perhaps

Lord Lugard got his first experience of native rule from them.
Nevert.heless, the Caravar. trade dominated every aspect of life
of these peoples and linked much of the territories of the em
pires to North Africa.

By 1885 Sir George Taubman Goldie's
3

trading firm, the united Africa Company, dispatched its deputy,
Joseph Thompson, to Sokoto.

In an attempt to control the caravan

trade Joseph Thompson signed a treaty of trade and jurisdiction
with the Sultan of Sokoto.
for the British.
3

Thus he secured this vast empire

An attempt was henceforth made to divert the

The United Africa Company was a combination of all
British firms as they were advised by Goldie. Within a short
time the company bought off the rival French trading firms and
thus it became the Royal Niger Company in 1886, 'Itlhose spheres
of influence covered much of Northern Nigeria.
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Northern trade to the southern coast.

This diversion of trade

notwithstanding, the north has preserved something of the North
African outlook with its

O\-ln

distinction as an ancient feudal

empire.
Aside from the savannah e.rnpires of the North, there was
the forest kingdom of Benin in the South.

The quality of

Benin's arts is widely recognized and the trade of Benin had
attracted the Portuguese from the earliest period of contact.
Benin developed culturally and commercially while its ruler-
the Oba of Benin--became an absolute monarch, especially in
spiritual affairs.

The people of Benin indulged in human

sacrifice to ward off any misfortune.

They also look to war

fare for territorial expansion and booty.

These actions of

the Oba and his subjects alarmed the a.gents of the Niger Coast
Protectorate who in 1897 sent qn emissary to Benin.

The envoy

was denied entry into Benin, and a British force wa.s called in.
Although Benin was partially destroyed and Oba Over ami was
4

captured, the ancient greatness of Benin is a source of pride
to the Binis.
Along the Guinea Coast was the Yoruba empire which teok
most of Dahomey, a former French colony.

In secular affairs

5

the empire was administered from Oyo, while the spiritual head
quarters was at lIe Ife.

Within the empire was the separate

4

Oba Overami
in 1923.
5

t...

as deposed and exiled to Calabar.

He died

Alafin of Oyo is a title given to the ruler, while Oni
relates to the ruler of Ife, and Alake to that of Abeokuta.

29
Egba kingdom with its Alake of Abeokuta.

The autonomy of Egba

land was retained until 1914 when a treaty recognizing its in
dependence was annulled and Indirect Rule was substituted.
Yoruba people did not stay in situ.

The

Either as a result of their

simple economy or as a result of intra-tribal wars the Yoruba
continued to found city-states such as Ondo, Ijebu, Ibadan,
Abeokuta, and Ilorin though the latter was conquered and occu
pied by the Fulani in 1831.

The internecine struggles of the

Yoruba people led to the disintegration of the empire, but the
Yoruba culture remains one of the most sophi$ticated in Nigeria.
The European demand for slaves and palm oil allowed the
growth of some city-states on the Niger delta.

King Jaja of

Opobo, King Pepple of Bonny and Nana of Istekiri, who inter
fered with European penetration and trade expansion were removed
6

and deported by

t~e

British Consul.

However, these city-states

formed the nuclei of the new towns occupied by some minorities
of the Niger Delta.

Their demand for a separate state within

the federation was a part of the irredentist movement that
colored the politics of the regional based civilian

gover~~ent.

In addition to the city-states and the empires already
mentioned there were Nupe'and Jukun kingdom of Kwarafa, as well
as the kingdom of Idah which may have been an offshoot of the
Jukun.

The territorial areas of these ancient kingdoms are at
6

King Pepple was depcsedand exiled in 1854 but he 'Vlas
restored in 1861. King Jaja was deported in 1887, while Chief
Nana was removed in 1894.
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present settled by some of the minority tribes of the Middle
Belt of Northern Nigeria, that is, those groups which during
the last civilian government demanded the creation of the Middle
Belt State.

The Hausa states of Gobir, Katsina, Daura, Kano;

Zazzau (Zaria) Yauri, Kebbi and Zamfara were defeated by the
Fu1ani Jihad of 1804.

The Hausa and the Fu1ani developed a

common culture and they present a homogeneity which is in con
trast to what prevails elsewhere in Nigeria.

Of course, within

this homogeneity, Kano, a metropolis with highly sophisticated
culture refused to be regarded as a fief of the Sardauna of
Sokoto.

It continued its defiance by demanding a separate Kano

state; and it admitted within its emirate a political party
based in the South.
It should be observed that some of these ancient empires,
city-states and kingdoms contain peoples who are still occupy
ing their traditional territories.

The Yorubas in Yoruba1and,

the Binis (Edos) in Benin, the Nupes in Nupe kingdom, the Ka
nuris in Bornu, and the Hausa-Fu1ani in the Fulani empire are
all rooted into the areas of their ancient states.

They remain

attached to their own glo:::-ious past instead of identifying with
Nigeria as a country.

This land and people concept has signifi- .

cant effects on social mobility, otherwise a great stimulus
towards national unity.

A member of another tribe who moves

into a non-traditional homeland is regarded as a stranger who
should live in Sabon-Gari.

Although the lack of common his

torical identity contributes to the absence of unity, it is
really the relationship of the people within these ancient
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city-states and empires with the central government that affects
national unity.
Some other African governments with similar problems have
undertaken different measures to forge national unity.

The

Gold Coast, a former: British colony, changed its name to Ghana,
an ancient empire within the present area of the country.

But

the ancient empire of Ghana did not extend to the northern
part of the Gold Coast which was a part of the Ashanti empire.
The Ashanti people in the northern territory showed a sepa
ratist tendency but it was minimized by the one-party system
in Ghana and the dictatorial rule of ex-President Nkrumah.

The

French Sudan assumed the ancient name of 14ali empire by joining
with Senegal in 1959-61 in the Mali Federation.

One might have

hoped for the success of t.he Mali Federation since Senegal had
been part of the rotali empire, and it had shared a common French
colonial history and administration.

In spite of such elements

of common identity the Mali federation failed because the
Senegalese felt that the union was dominated by the Sudanese.
Above all, there was opposition to the federation by France and
·the Ivory Coast.

On the other hand, Uganda got its independence

. with live-kingdoms of Bunyoro, Ankole, Karagwe and Buganda with
in its borders.

The British had not wanted to destroy these

kingdoms as long as the kings and their subjects were loyal to
the British monarch.

But to foster national consciousness the

president of Uganda, Milton Obote, drove into exile the last
strong king of Buganda,

K~bbak

II.

He disbanded the Kabbaka's
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private army and he dissolved the king's parliament.

Milton

Obote undertook the dissolution of the live-kingdoms within his
country.

At present, it is too soon to accord full success to

Obote's programme of national unity.

Nevertheless, it is clear

that the memory of, or continued existence of ancient kingdoms
within some African countries has caused problems of national
coalescence and has been the source of mLlch discord with the
central government.
Within the artificial creation of Nigeria, a conglomer
ate of ancient empires and city-states, live 250 officiallY
recognized ethnic groups 'Ili t~ variations i.n tradition, culture,.
language, loyalty and religion.

It may be of interest to give

a cross-section of distinctive traditions and customs in the
country.

The traditional kingdonl of Benin, now the Midwest

State, and the Fulani empire of the north will be examined:
A Bini deciding to become a Christian. Such a
decision is not only the concern of the individual;
it has repercussions on the wider family, especially
if the person ..• is the head of one of Benin's extended
family groups •••. Ancestor worship is stil, deeply
rooted in the daily routine of the Bini ..•. The Fu
lani ••. if he is a follower of Islam--fond of his Ko
ran ••.. Many Fulani are however Pagan, with no marked
tendencies for Islam but working out a life guided
by instinct, superstition and animism ••.• They will
quickly vacate an area where one of -theIr people diee
7

Federal Ministry of Information, Nigeria 1960 A- Special
Independent Issue of Nigeria Magazine, October 1960.
(lo'ederal
Government Printer, Lagos, Nigeria, 1960) p. 163.
8

Ibid. pp. 184-85
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Within Nigeria there is accordingly no common tradition
and culture on which modern nationalism could be based.

The

lack of unity of culture and tradition characteristic of Ni
gerian society as a whole is even more pronounced among the
eli te who lead the country.

The European Po'vers introduced

into African society their standards of value and modes of
life, mainly in the cities.

The Africans in these urban cen

ters have copied this European culture and sometimes they seem
to become more Europeanized than the Europeans themselves.
Progress towards civilization is even measured by how much of
European culture these westernized Africans could adopt.

But

the imported culture fails to spread evenly and to dominate
the country.

The failure of the western oriented culture to

replace fully native cultural traditions, or perhaps the failure
of the two cultures to produce a 'workable almagam, affects the
s~ability

of the country.

Likewise grea.t variation in religious beliefs has been
detrimental to the unity of Nigeria.

Between the eleventh and

twelfth centuries, Islam expanded rapidly into North Africa
and the western Sudan.

During the early part of the nineteenth

century the European powers were looking for spheres of influ
ence by means of geographical discovery and legitimate trade
in Africa; and a revival of Islam expansion through holy wars
9

of jihads took place in Northern Nigeria.

Uthman dan Fodio

of the Fulani tribe became the leader of this reforming and
9

The late Ahmadu Bello, the Sarduana of Sokoto and
premier of Northern Nigeria was the grandson.
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expansionistic Islamic movement.

He appointed the fourteen

flag bearers who spread the jihad with burning zeal in Northern
Nigeria.

Although the jihad was halted in Bornu by Mohammed

el-Kanemi, the spread of Islam filtered in through the Fulani
traders and herdsmen.

Northern Nigeria became not only Islam

ized but also Fulanized for the Fulani, having conquered
Northern Nigeria, became the ruling class over other inhabit
ants.

The spread of Islam and Fulani overlordship penetrated

the Yoruba state of Ilorin.

Before the death of Uthman dan

Fodio in 1817, much of Northern Nigeria was greatly influenced
by Arabic-Islam imperialism.
While the jihad spread in the North, the European traders
and missionaries established stations in the South.

By 1836,

the Church Missionary Society gained influence in Abeokuta in
Yorubaland.

Betvleen 1841 and 1852 the Church Missionary Society

and the Wesleyan Methodists were very active sowing seeds of
European religious imperialism in Lagos, Badagry and much of
Yorubaland in Western Nigeria.

By 1846 the Church Missionary

Society crossed the Niger into the East and opened a station
at Calabar.

In 1886 the Irish Catholic Missionaries undertook

evangelization in Onitsha in Iboland.

During the early part of

the nineteenth century the South moved towards European re
ligious values and the North embraced the Islamic culture.
There is another. interesting' aspect concerning the geo
'graphic distribution of religious beliefs in Nigeria.

By 1900,

when Lord Lugard became t.he high commissioner of the North, he
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supported the treaty of the Royal Niger Company which did not
allow Christian missionaries to penetrate into the Muslim North,
unless such missionaries were invited by the emirs.
Christian missionaries were

encourag~d

pagan Middle Belt of the North.

The

to evangelize in the

Between 1903 and 1905 the

Church Missionary Society was invited by the emirs of Bida and
Zaria to open Christian stations in their emirates.

Thus with

in the North there are pockets of Christians as there are of

pagans.

In the South, likewise, there are enclaves of paganislll

and Islam.

When the population of Nigeria is examined, about

44 percent of -the people are Moslems, t1hile 22 percent are
Christians.

The remainde:c stick to their traditional cults,

But when the geographical distribution of religion is examined,
the North is two-thirds Moslem, while the South is Christian
and pagan.

, I:

The North as an Islamic bloc detaches the region from

,I

the country and tends to link itself ,'lith the Arab world and
other African Islamic countries.

It may be of interest to

point out that the late Sarduana of Sokoto, Premier of Northern
Nigeria, Vice-President of the World Islamic Congress and
President General of the Northern Peoples' Congress, denied
the government of Israel participation in a fishing industry
in Lake Chad, despite the fact that the development program

was offered by Israel to the Federal Government.

il

The civilian

government was forced to respect such a geographical ban since
Lake Chad is within the jurisdiction of the North.

But the ban

II
I
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of Israel in the North was embarassing to other regional and
Federal Governments \ihich maintained cordial relations \'lith the
Israeli government.

Thus the religious divisions in Nigeria

complicate foreign relations of the country and endanger the
unity of the federation.
In the Christian South, especially in the East, denomi
national differences sometimes flare up as when in 1965 Catho
lies opposed the East Regional Government's plan to take over
education.

During the Civil War 1967-69 the Biafrans believed

that they were fighting a war against the Moslem North and
therefore they appealed to all the Christian countries of the
world for aid to restrain Islamic advancement at the expense
of the Christian East.

Since the East was t\<To-thirds Catholic,

many people of the Catholic faith readily accepted humanitarian
arguments regarding the np.cessity of keeping Biafra alive, and
thus, wittingly or unwittingly, aided an attempt to dism@.mber
the Federation.

It is easy to conclude that religious loyalty

is very strong in Nigeria and stands in the way of national
unity.

,

I I

For comparative purposes, Sudan, the former Anglo-Egyptian
Sudan, also presents a case of disunity arising from the dis
tribution of religious beliefs.

A civil war seldom mentioned

in the world press is going on between the North and the South.
In the North the people are mostly Moslems and of Arabic cul
ture.

.I

In the South some people are Christians while others

practice their traditional beliefs.
. that they have Afri.can consciousness.

The Southerners also feel
1-.t present the South is

II
I

J\ ,
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rebelling against the Moselm-Arab-culture dominated government
of the North.

It is true that cultural variation plays a part

in Sudanese disunity, but the control of government by the Mos
lem North suggests that emphasis must be put on religious dif
ferences.

During the era of British administration, Moslem

preachers met restrictions in the South while Christian mis
sionaries were encouraged.

Arabic language and influences
10

were also restricted in the South.

But with Sudanese indepen

dence the Moslem-dominated government tried to Arabicize
education and it aroused more resentment from the South.

It

is true that the Arabisation of education would have contributed
towards national consciousness, but at the same time, it may
be regarded as cultural and religious imperialism.

It is

possible to blame the British administration for its restric
tion of Moslem proselytes in the South and thus failure to
press for an integration.

Since

th~

Moslem-dominated govern

ment failed to adopt a federal constitution as advocated by
the Sudan African National Union, one of the oldest political
parties in the South, not all blame can be laid at the feet of
the imperial powers.

The Anya Nya--guerrilla fighters--have

taken to the forest to fight and liberate the South.
Another case in point of religious differences as a
factor of unity is that of Ethiopia, the oldest independent
10

George W. Shepherd, Jr. "National Integration and the
Southern Sudan." . The Journal of Modern African" S"tudies Vol. 4 :

!..:...

p. 200.
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kingdom in Africa.

By 1833 It"aly ent.ered the eastern sector of

Ethiopia and occupied what came to be called Eritrea.

In 1889

Italy and Ethiopia signed a treaty to define the boundary of
Eritrea.

Italy was not satisfied with Eritrea and in its

attempt to occupy other areas of Ethiopia, Italy fought the
battle of Adowa in 1896 in which it was defeated.
the Italian defeat it still maintained Eritrea.

In spite of
After the

Second World War Eritrea was given as a trust territory to
Ethiopia; but in 1952 .Eritrea was joined to Ethiopia after a
plebiscite.

In Ethiopia, from very ancient times, most of

the people are Ethiopian Orthodox Christians.

Within Eritrea,

the Tigreans are Ethiopian Orthodox; along the coast, the Afar
and the Danakil are

~loslems.

At present the Eritrean Moslems

are pursuing a liberation movement which endangers the unity
of Ethiopia.

It may be remarked in passing that if the Eri

trean Liberation Movement and the Sudanese African Liberation
Union succeed, Afro-Arab unity in African countries may well
be endangered.
Where there is a large concentration of some religious
.belief, even if the believers \'1ere formerly ruled by two
different colonial administrations, national unity can be
attained rather easily.

Italian Somaliland and British Somalia

were colonized by two different' European powers.

But there is

a large concentration of Moslems in both countries.
the same Arab culture and language.

There is

British Somalia was granted

independence in 1960 and within the year Italian Somaliland
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gained its freedom.

On July 1, 1960, without much fanfare, the

two national assemblies formed an independent Republic of So
malia.

At present there is the French Somaliland outside the

Republic, and there are some Somalis in the northern provinces
of Kenya, the Haud and Ogaden regions of Ethiopia.

Pan Somalia

. may be the next alternative although such option may result in
conflict with the neighboring countries.

However, the national

consciousness of Somalia is only delayed by differing colon.ial
administrations.
!National consciousness may also be developed where reli
gious beliefs are evenly spread out.

(Of course there may be

other factors such as the consensus of opinion Of the national
leaders.)

Tanganyika and the island of Zanzibar were formeL

German colonies which after the First World War were given to
Great Britain as Trust territories.
and Christians in both countries.

There are pagans, Moslems
In 1961 the mainland of

Tanganyika was granted independence: and in 1963 Zanzibar was
decolonized.

In 1964 the two heads of state agreed to unify

the two independent countries into the Republic of Tanzania.
Of course national unity may be achieved in spite of
differing religious beliefs.

The idea of a common empire his

tory well directed by the national leaders, for example, may
activate national consciousness.

Such a case of national unity

achieved despite religious diversity is that of the two Cam
eroons.

Northern and Southern Cameroons were former German

colonies which had been administered as one country.

After
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t.he First World War, Northern Cameroon was divided into two
sections.

The \'lestern part, close to Nigeria, was given to

Great Britain as a trust. terri t.ory; and. it was administered as
a part of Northern Nigeria.

A plebiscite conducted in 1961

allowed this section of the northern Cameroons to be integrated
with Nigeria, and it <;'1as named the Sardauna Province.

The

east sector of the Northern Cameroons was administered by
France as a trust territory.

The Southern Cameroons were ad

ministered as a. trust territory and as an administrative part
of Eastern

Nige~ia.

Between 1957 and 1950 the Southern Came

roons became a quasi-territory.

An 1961, after the indepen

dance of Nigeria, a plebiscite was held in the Southern

il

Cameroon and it decided to join the former French trust terri
·tory of Northern Cameroon, which had received its independence
in 1960 • .!Within the Northern Cameroon, now Eastern Cameroon,
Moslems predominate with some Christians and pagans; while in
the Southern Cameroon, now Western Cameroon, Christians pre
dominate, but there are pagans and only very few Moslems.
Despite a mixed distribution of religious beliefs and a past
history of SUbjection to two colonial pOi'mrs, the ·two Cameroons-
Western and Eastern--have formed a urdted republic.

However,

in this case both t.erritories had shared a common German co1on
ia1 background; the memory of this, perhaps, gave the inhabi
tants grounds for believing that the French and the British
had willfully divided them.

The unification of the two Came

roons, despite different religious faiths, language, colonial

I

:1"
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administrations, culture, and above all, ethnic groups, is a
challenge to other Africa.l1 countries that all too easily blame
European powers for their internal disunity.
National unity is not necessarily created on the basis
of a common religious belief.

Once again Nj.geria supplies an

illustration of this condition.
thirds of the people are l-1oslems.

Within Northern Nigeria, two
Thus in nearly all the

emirates, with the exception pf the Middle Belt area, there is
a concentration of Islamic adherents who should hold together.
But in the last cbtilian government the Kano emirate failed to
support the regional secular and spiritual leader.

Alhaji

Aminu Kano based the Nigerian Elements Progressive Union in
Kano as an opposition party to the Northern regional govern
ment.

A Southern-based political party--the Action Group-

was allowed to campaign in Kano during the 1959 Federal elec
tion.

Along with the Middle Belt, Kano demanded a separate

state in an attempt to subdivide the northern region.

In

1953, the first riot between the northerners and the southern
ers took place in Kano city: and in 1966 the massacre of some
people of Eastern Nigerian origin also occurred in the city.
A close examination of the composition of the population of
K~no

the

emirate shows a large concentration of Hausas who were
overlord~

of Northern Nigeria until conquered by the

Fulani during the

Jih~d

in 1803.

Although the Fulani stmse

quently adopted the Hausa language, there seems to be resent
ment wherever Rausa consciousness remains strong.

Furthermore,

i.'.

¥.
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i
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Kano City is the most sophisticated city in the North.
.the largest Sabon Gari on its outskirts.

I

It has

It is an old caravan

trade center and a modern commercial place.

Since the con

struction of its international airport it has become the great
est metropolis of the North.

The special characteristics of

Kano strongly suggest that growing sophistication weakens the
support of traditional religion as a unifying force.
With the exception of Northern Nigeria, where Rausa is
widely spoken, each ethnic group in Nigeria has its own langu
age.

In many cases the only common language is English.

Even

though English is the official language of Nigeria, it is not
the lingua franca of the illiterate masses.

This impedes the

communication and dissemination of political ideas both within
the regions and across regional and tribal lines.
as such is divided into language blocs.

The country

Nevertheless, the use

of English as a common medium of expression by the educated
Nigerians has produced national consciousness within that group_
Perhaps, if during the sixty years of British occupation of
the country the colonial administration had aimed at cultural
imperialism and seriously t.ried to spread English culture
throughout t.he country, nat.ional unity would not now be plagued
by some of its present problems.

But, of course, the British

would have been accused of dest::roying the nat.i\7e language and
culture, and of trying to turn Africans into Englishmen.
The failure of cultural assimilation as a unifying force
can be especially well examined

~n

the former French West

I '
I

<

•
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Africa, comprising Senegal, Sudan, Hauretanfa, Upper Volta,
Niger, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Dahomey.

Between 1902 and 1904

French laws allowed these colonies to be grouped and admin
istered as a unit with headquarters at Dakar in Senegal.
Fortunately there was no other European colony that intervened
disruptively.

To be sure, the former British colonies in West

Africa were interspersed among the French territories, but
French West Africa constituted a bloc extending from the coast
inland to join other French colonies of North Africa.

The

French system of direct administra.tion refused to recognize
African life and the colonial administrators \\?orked hard to
make Frenchmen out of the Africans under their control. Afri
can children were taught French and French culture.

The

entirety of French west Africa received one language and cul
turei as a result, one might have thought French West Africa
11

would have maintained its unity after independence.

Yet in

dependence was no sooner granted to each of the countries than
the federali.zed structure collapsed.

Apparently, French West

Africa was only a house of cards held together by French pres
11

In September 1958 President Charles de Gaulle offered
the colonies a chance to hold a referendum so that they could
choose between becoming self-governing republics within a
French community and complete independence. Member colonies
of French West Africa and Equatorial Africa voted to remain
as republics, but Guinea, a member of E'rench West Africa,
voted for complete independence. In 1959 Senegal and Sudan
formed the Mali federation and demanded complete independence.
Shortly thereafter other members demanded complete indepen
dence; the French community went defunct. The Mali Federation
was dismantled. French West Africa and Equatorial Africa
became fragmented.
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ence.

The French language and culture seem to have been suc

cessfu11y imposed on the younger generation, but the older
generation, importrult sustaining factors of tradition and
stability, were left out.

It seems clear that African life

continued beneath the French superstructure.

The elements of

unity introduced by the French in French West Africa did not
suffice to produce a lasting national consciousness in the face
of the continuity of native African differences.
There is yet another centrifugal force working against
national unity in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa.

Some tribal

groups cross regional lines within Nigeria with the result that
a.given people may be divided under two different political
administrations; for example, the Yoruba in I10rin, a part of
Northern Nigeria and the bulk of Yoruba in the Western region,
and the Ibo in Eastern region and a part in the Midwest.

All

these peoples had been settled in the different areas for a
very long time, but in more recent times Ibos migrated to the
12

North.

The September Massacre in 1966 confirmed the weakness

of Nigerian unity when confronted by social and tribal or
regional tensions.

The effect of long-standing cross-regional

settlement can be observed in the Nigerian civil war in which
the Ibos of the Republic of Biafra (Eastern Region) were in
league with the Ibos of the Republic of Benin (Miawest).
Cross-regional settlement of ethnic groups in Nigeria is the
12

~.

Some Ibos were murdered in the North.
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cause of much friction.

Perhaps ,the present creation of more

states ,.;here some tribes are g-1.ven states of their own will
mtnimize the friction.
It may also be remarked that some ofehe tribal groups
run across international boundaries so that there are the
Yorubas in Dahomey, and the Hausas and Fulani in Niger and
the Cameroons.

The problem of cross-regional ties then can

have international implications.

For instance, the Action

Group party which governed the bulk of the Yoruba in \\'cstern
region suggested in 1960 the incorporation of the Yorubas of
Dahomey as the fourth region in Nigeria, and the Dahome,iran
13
Yorubas r3ceived the idea f;:rYorably. This suggests quite
clei..'\rly that some Nigerian tribes think of territorial agg.1':an
dizement which is likely to be a source of conflict and po
litical disunity.
Nigeria is not the only nation in Africa 'tvhere tribal
groups run across international boundaries.

There are Somali

communities in eastern Ethiopia, in the northern district of
Kenya and in French Somaliland, although the bulk of the Somali
. live in the Republic of Somalia.
in Kenya and in Tanzania.

The r.1asai people a.re located

In Morocco, Ifni, Rio de Oro,

Algeria, Tunisia, Libya anq Mauretania there are Berbers and
Bedouin tribesmen.

As a

r~sult

of such patterns of mixed

settlement, some Afric.an countries have quarrelled and fought
13

I. William Zartman~"ThePolitics of ,Boundaries in
North and West Africa," The J'ournal 'Of Hodern Afrie'an Studies.
(Cambridge University Pres$, 1965) Vol. 3:2, p. 170.
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about their frontiers.

Algeria and Morocco, Ethiopia and So

malia, Kenya and Somalia, Ghana and Togo, just to name a fe\"l,
have all faced border disputes arising from the geographic
spread of a people.

This division of a people between two or

three countries has frequently beE:1:ll blamed on the Eurc..)pean
powers, that is African countries are said to have been arti
ficially created without regard to the African feelings.

HO~i-

ever, the European powers which colonized Africa should not
receive all of the blame.

The Bedouin, t:b.e Masai and the

Hausa-Fulani are nomsQic herdsmen and caravan traders.

The

traditional African economy of sedentary agriculture and
cattle herding moved some of the African tribesmen a'l.Yay from
their traditional homelands; they could not multiply and stay
in si'tu.

To some of the tribes the. homeland 'vas wherever food

and good pasture could be obtained, or perhaps ",here a profit
able market could be located.

'I'heir boundaries of a tribal

unit followed a seasonal moving frontier; they did not define
themselves within any fixed 'state'.

The geographically con

ditioned mobility of some African tribes fragmented them as
14 .
. semi-stateless people, though of course it did not destroy
their sense of totem and the sense of belong.ing to a tribe.
In some cases it was not the European powers which
divided a truly unified ethnic group.

For instance, the king

14

It does not mean anarch but it means lack of boundary
limitation.

.

•
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doms of Buganda, Bunyoro, Ankole and KarRgl,A,Te we.re tied together
to become economically and politically viable.

African $ociety

was fluid; some tribes such as the Yoruba had a past history of
intra-tribal quarrels and wars.
and intra-tribal wars, there

As a result of such quarrels

Wert:!

offshoots of a tribal group

which settled outside the ancestral home area under a new
leadership.

For instance, Abeokuta in Egbals.nd was f01..mded in

1830 by Yoruba refugees

f~om

Ibadan.

They called themselves

the Egbas even though a branch of the Yoruba people.

The

spread of the Yorubas and some other African tribes was due to
wars or disobedience to their tribal leader who might 'chen
force them to .round a ne\'1 homeland outside the terri b:>r lal
area.
Another factor of great importance which transferred
some African tri.bes to other areas and thus encouraged the
easy breakthrough of artificial boundaries by the European
powers was the internal slave trade as well as the slave trade
across the Sahara Desert, both of which had existed before the
advent of the European powers.

Constant warfare for slave

raids caused waves of migration of people to well protected
15

areas.

In the former Eastern region there are the Eastern

Ibibio Ikono people in Anang province while the bulk of Ibibio

15
Migration of people occurred in historic times in
Africa. It might have been caused by demand for food and land
hunger, by flood, by superstitious beliefs, by trade and by a
desire for protection against a.'l aggressive neighbor.
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people live in uyo province.

The wars instigated by the Euro

pean powers themselves in their efforts to subjugate certain
areas also caused waves of migration, for example the French
war with Futa Toro State in 1817, Faidherbe conflict with alHaji Umar in 1857, an.d the Fulani war with Britain between
1901 and 1906.

When the European powers had once established fixed
boundaries for their colonial possessions, some African tribes
that had moved away from their homeland were no longer able to
return.

Most of the European administrators were not experts

in anthropology and sociology and did not understand the tri
bal cultures and lineage.

A great many of the administrators

were Eoldiers sent as officials, often as a result of govern
mental
pline.

patronage~

and what interested them was strict disoi

They insisted on forcing some of the nomadic African

tribes to settle against their 'will.

Most of the European

administrators did no·t know the language of the tribal states
in which they worked.

Guided by the sense of a "mission" of

representing a higher civilization the agents of the European
powers decide1 on what was good enough for the Africans.

It

was not that {he Africans har no states but such states did
not limit the movement of pebple outside the frontier.

The

state was the influence of a recognized ruler along with the
loyalty of the sUbjects.

Thus the application of the European

idea of a state to African tribes ignored the lfrican modes of
life which were in conformity with their basicleconomy.
I

',v

49

..

It may be remarked that some European powers, for instance
Great Britain, after it had claimed Nigeria, did try to trace
the lineage of some tribes and to

reg~oup

them.

Be~ween

1920

and 1930 the British made a survey of the various totems of
groups of people mainly in the Eastern provinces where a
s'trongly organized ind1genou,s goverrunent cove.r:ing a large area
was non-existent.

Wherever the totems \-rere identical these

people were grouped under the same clan with a clan council and
a paramount chief..

It might be argued that. such

r~grouplng

came late and of course did not bring into one fold those
people of the same totem who lived either In the French or the
German territories.

The primary purpose of this reorganization

was not to re-settle the 'nomadic' tribesmen of the area for
their own good, but to make it easy for the administrators to
supervise them.

Even so, it was a step in the right direction.

The people needed a sense of a large core area as an element of
governmental jurisdiction.

Of course this structure of admin·

istrative units covering extensive areas presents another
problem for national unity.
The problem of enclaves of minorities within regions
dominated by a

pow~rful

tribe that is in the majority exists

for many African countries.

!n Kenya there are the Kikuyu who

are in the majority, and the Luo, the Masai, the Kipsigis and
the Gusii who are minorities.

In Uganda, the Bakanda are in

the majority while the Teso, the Acholi, the Banyoro and the
Ganda are all minorities.
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In Northern Nigeria the Hausas are

5~

million, the Fulani

3 million, the Kanuri l!:i million •. In Western Nigeria are the
Yorubas

4~

million; the Edo 452,000; the Western Ibo 374,000

and the Urhobo 346,000, though at present the last three named
tribes are in the Midwest state.

In East Nigeria there are

the Ibo 4 million, the Ibibio 750,000, the Annang 450,000 and
16
the Ijaw 265,000. The dominant tribes obtained control of

I

'i

I

political power in each such region; the policy of regional
government became a source of tribal rivalry and aroused con
stant fear in the minorities.

Between 1957 and 1958 the

Minorities Commission was appointed.

The Willink Commission

admitted that 'there were fears of tribal domination and dis
crimination.

But the Willink Commission was strongly against

the creation of new states in Nigeria, even though in most of
the minority areas there were movements favoring separate
.
17
statehood such as the Middle Belt, the Benin Delta and the
Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers states.

In 1943 Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe,

then leader of the National Council of Nigerian Citizens, and
later the Governor-General and President of· Nigeria, had
suggested the regrouping of Nigeria into eight political ad
ministrative units.

In 1953 Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the leader

of the Action Group and later the Premier of Western Nigeria
wanted a division of Nigeria into nine states.

But in 1957

16
...... .
. Nige:r"i'aYe'arBOok 19·64 (Times Press Limited, Lagos)
p. 13.

17
.
The name was changed to the Midwest State, which was
the only state created out of the Western Region in 1963.

II
,
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Dr. Azikiwe in a speech at ADa opposed the creation of ne\>T
states at the expense of Eastern Nigeria.

The colonial govern-

ment,on the other hand, felt that not more than one new state
should be created from each region and that it must be econom
16
ically and politically viable. Western Nigeria agreed to the
principle of permitting ·the :;-eparatlon of minorities by
creating of new states, not only in the West but ir. other
regions as well.

The North and the East opposed the bulkan

. ization of their regions.

British government was paralysed

in its efforts to cater to the self-determination of the
minorities and left them to the mercy of the majority tribes.
But Her Majesty's Government saw to it that constitutional
guarantees were provided to allay the fears of the minorities
befox'e it granted independence to the country.

However I the

interpretation of such constitutional guarantees was left to
the majority tribes that controlled the government.

It is

really doubtful whether Great Britain and other European powers
in Africa experienced minority problems during their adminis
tration.

France was busily engaged in cultural assimilation

of the Africans and they were even given French citizenship.
Thus no tribe was in the position

~o

dominate other5.

were such tribal cultural dominance it was dormant.

If there
Great

Britain by its indirect rule aLso restricted the dominance of
18

The colonial gover~ent suggested the delay of
independence for two years in order to attend to the wishes of
the minorities. But the major political parties failed to
listen.

La

[

~
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ana tribe. over another.

Each ·::lari which was a sub-division of

a tribe had its own leader who directed the institutions of the
clan; and there was no fear of tribal or ctan subordination.
Though Great Britain is at times accused

o~ having favored the

dominance of Hausa-Fulani in Nigeria, and Bakanda in Uganda,
the British generally act.ed as a paternal administrator and
saw no purpose in awakening the fears of minorities.

It seems

that the acute development of minority fears arose towards the
end of the colonial era with the hanning of government authority
into the hands of the majority which can come from one tribe
and be strongly inclined to ignore the wishes of others.
Furthermore, it came up because of the type of political parties
which assumed political leadership and the slogans they used.
It is important to examine the political parties and the
cultural organizations which reveal the political anatomy of
Nigeria most clearly.

The development of political parties in

Nigeria has been regional and accordingly reflects local and
tribal jealousies.

During the Second World War many cultural,

literary and professional associations were formed in Lagos.
There were also some social clubs and one or two political
19
parties such as the Young Democrats. In August 1944 most of
these associations and clubs federated as the National Council
of Nigeria and the Cameroons.
19

Fro~

its composition it seems

.
It was a youth wing of the Nigerian National Democratic
Party formed by Herbert Marcauly and based only in Lagos.

.'-;

.
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that the N.C.N.C. had few immediate political pretensions, but
it did generate nationalistic feelings against the British.
The Ibo Union--a cultural

o~ganization

to promote the advanced

education of Ibo--had been formed in 1936.
of the N.C.N.C.

It became a member

By 1948, its leC;;l.der Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe became

the president of both the

N.t~.N.C.

and the Ibo Union.

The

N.e.N.C. had many offshoo'.;s in Iboland in Eastern Nigeria.
Because of the strong ties between the rbo State Union and the
N.C.N.C. the Egbe Orno Oduduwa--a Yoruba cultural association
founded in London in 1945--developed more Yoruba-oriented
nationalism after it moved its base to Lagos in 1948.

In

March 1951 Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the Secretary-General of
Egbe Omo Oduduwa set up a political wing, the Action 'Group,
in order to gain control of the Western House that was estab
lished under the Macpherson Constitution of 1951.

Under this

c9nstitution, Lagos, the Federal capital was made a part of
Western Nigeria.

Dr. Azikiwe vainly opposed the incorporation

of Lagos; it cost him his constituency and seat in the Central
Legislature.

He moved to the East and strengthened the N.C.N.C.

He was then elected in Onitsha constituency to the Eastern
House where he became the premier of the region in 1953-59.
In December 1949 a cultural organization to embrace all nor
therners was formed in Kano.

In 1951 the Northern Peoples'

Congress became more openly political in emphasis and it gained
control of the Northern Region House of Assembly established by
the Macpherson Constitution.

The Action Group was the only
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organization formed expressly as a poli.tical party, although it
stood to oppose Dr. Azikiwe, who personified the threat of Ibo
domination.

The N.P.C. became a political party to prevent the

two southern political parties from dominating the North and.
shaping the new federal constitution of 1951 to their own advantage~

The N.C.N.C. originally seemed to be the only broadly

based organization, but it was much too loosely federated to
maintain a common political ideology.

It is true that it

"attacked British colonialism, but by 1951 it was dominated by
the Ibo State Union and correspondingly diverted its strength
to the East.
. ""

In Northern Nigeria, the non-Moslem and non-Hausa-Fulani
in the Middle" Belt formed the united Middle Belt Congress in
1955 with the goal of creating the Middle Belt State and thus
escaping from Fulani-Hausa domination.

Shortly after its

formation the UMBC broke into two faction: the Middle Zone
League which supported the N.P.C.; and the Middle Belt Peoples'
Party which was allied to the N.e.N.C. and the Northern Elernents Progressive Union.

In 1950 some young northerners broke

·away from the NPC and they formed a pol.itical party, the
Northern Elements Progressive Union in 1952.

They attacked the

northern emirs· and their authority which they claimed was conservative.

The NEPU was really a political party desiring to

oppose and to reform the NPC.

Its leader, Aminu Kana, thus

appealed to all the dissenters of the No~th.

Based in Kano,

the NEPU advocated a united. Nigeria instead of the regional
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ideas pf the NPC.

While the NEPU was an ally of the N.C.N.C.,

the UMBC allied itself to the Action Group.

The AG and the

N.C.N.C. failed to establish themselves in Northern Nigeria
apart from becoming allies of splinter parties.

In this role

the two major parties of the South had to appeal to a wider
variety of issues and more divergent elements than they other
wise would have to do.
In the minority area of the Eastern Region, the united
National Independence Party ,,,ith Dr. Udoudoma as one of its
leading members became established.

~ince

some of the leading

members of the party belonged to the IbibioState Union--a
cultural organization formed in 1928 for educational advance

,I
I

ment--there is reason to believe-that it served to defe.nd
minority interests against Ibo domination.

The united National

Independence Party sponsored a mO'lement to form a new state
that would have embraced all the minority areas of Calabar,
Oqo)a and Rivers.

The COR State-Movement became anti-N.C.N.C.;

and the"UNIP more or less inevitably became an ally of the
Action Group.

In 1957 the Action Group-UNIP gained 18 seats

from the COR state area while the N.C.N.C. obtained only 17.
The COR state movement and the UNIP were regarded as for
mentors of ill feeling against the N.C.N.C. and as generators
of hatred against the Ibos as well.

During the East Regional
20
election campaign of 1962 the COR Advocate press was burnt.
20

I

Some Nigerian political parties maintained thugs, a
group of undesirables, jailbirds, noted criminals, able-bodied
unemployed young men and they could do anything during campaign.
On electioneering and rallies they went as pressmen and
musicians. They acted" as secret security officers for certain
members of the party.

I

I

I
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Pressure forced the TJNIP to disband.

As a result the COR

1\

state movement went underground opposing the sominant body
politic of the Eastern Region.

When the Rivers and the South

eastern states wp.re created in 1967 by Yakubu Gowan, the Head
of the Federal Military Government, the separatist feeling of
the minorities was given expression, as it was minority prob
lems that were one of the causes of the Civil War.
Although the'Action Group had passed a resolution in
1955 favoring the creation of the Midwest state, the Yoruba
people in the Western Region were not united as a party.
There were some N.C.N.C. supporters in the West, but it was
not their stronghold and at times what happened to N.C.N.C.
supporters in the West reverberated on Action Groupers in the
East.

Sometimes there were open conflicts between the sup

porters of these two ,parties in both regions.

In 1958 Alhaji

Adgoke Adelabu, one of the strong supporters of the N.C.N.C.,
had an automobile accident at Shagamu Square, Ibadan, as a
result of which he later died.

His accidental death caused

killing, property destruction and fighting between members of
the Action Group and the N.C.N.C.

In 1962 Dr. Michael Okpara,

the leader of the N.C.N.C. came on an election campaign to
Uyo North in the East, the constituency of Chief Efiong Okon
Eyo who was leader of the Action Group.

The electioneering

produced killing, destruction of property and fighting among
the N.C.N.C., the police and the Action

G~oup.

Chief Eyo was

arrested, later tried and jailed, but he won the election in
I

I
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.
jail, while all this was going on, the Action Group in Western·
Nigeria faced an internal crisis in 1962.

The premier of the

region and deputy leader of the Action Group was ousted by the
leader of the Action Group, Chief Obafemi A.wolo\OTo.

Chief S.A.

Akintola immediately formed a new party to entrench himself in
power.

Nigeria became a multi-party and multi-tri.bal society.
None of the Nigerian political parties have ever had a

strong foothold countrywide; whenever any of them crosses
regional lines it has been regarded as a troublemaker and a
danger to regional security.

When any of these parties make

inter-regional alliances, the leaders and supporters of the
parties that co-operated with a 'foreign' regional party have
been persecuted.

The witch-hunting tactics used against such

'foreign' parties obscured the fact that the major party of
each region was actually persecuting members of minority
tribes of that region who belonged to thes,e parties.

The

political parties were handicapped in the 'diffusion of ideas
beyond regional lines and tended to become established as the
voice of a particular ethnic group in a given governmental
region.

In 1964 in order to face the general Federal election

the NPC and the NNDP joined to form the Nigerian National
Alliance while the N.C.N.C., the AG, the UMBC and the NEPU
formed the united Progressive Grand Alliance.

But the par

ticularistic tendency of the Nigerian political parties from
I

I

1951 to 1963 had already affected the unity of the country_
The Alliance developed on the eve of the Federal election was
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a marriage of convenience.

After the 1964 Federal election

the leadership of the country fell to the Nigerian National
Alliance, the mainspring of which was the Northern Peoples'
21

Congress that had ruled the country since 1959.

The boycott

of the 1964 Federal election by the UPGA revealed that Nigerian
political parties could net work in harmony, and that
regionalism was triumphant.
The Federal Parliament became controlled by the region
ally based dominant political party of the North, the NPC, and
the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group which it pri.marily represented.
This situation threatened other regional governments, parties
and major ethnic groups.

In short, the Federal Parliament

became the focal point for inter-:regional political differences.
The result was turbulence.

The Federal Parliament controlled

by the NPC with the aid of i·ts junior partner the N.C.N.C. I
declared a state of emergency in the Western Region and dis·
solved the regional government in 1962.
to a series of crises in that region.

This was the prelude
After six months of

emergency administration the Federal government returned power
to Akintola's faction which then allied itself with the Northern
Peoples' Congress.

Events in Western Nigeria were really a test

case concerning how the Federal government would conduct itself
and if it could maintain the unity of the country.
21

Akintola's

Many members of the NNA in the North were returned
unopposed before the election day. The fact is there were some
UPGA candidates in such constituencies who were unable to file
election papers. The UPGA, therefore, felt that the election
was rigged and boycotted it.

II
!
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new party, the Ntgerian National Democratic Party, ruled
Western Nigeria for three years without any election, despite
popular demand for one.

In October, 1965, the Akinto1a Govern

. ment finally conducted an election, but it was at once accused
of rigging and other malpractice.

At this point, the

opposi~

tion party, the Action Group countered with a full scale ram
page, killing and destroying the property of some of Akinto1a's
supporters.

The opposition party even went so far as to set

up a rival government.

The NPC controlled Federal Government

just stood by watching this corrosion of national unity.

Such

incidents make only too apparent that the distribution of
political ideas and the control of . the access to power have
been great disintegrating forces in Nigeria.

The way in which

cultural associations were politicized really allows national
consciousness to be founded on tribalism and the effect is an
atrophied national unity.

Party politics in Nigeria has pro

duced political restlessness and a tendency to violence, and
correspondingly undermines the role of law as a unifying force.
In some African countries, instead of allowing a mu1ti
national or regional po1itica1·parties, a single party has
gained a political monopoly.

The assumption seems to have been

that a unified political party reflects a homogeneous society
and that the nation-state can be best given a semblance of unity
in the person of a charismatic leader, who is the chief exec
utive and the legislator at one and the same time.

In the Ivory

Coast, the Parti Democ.ratique de cote d'Ivoire which started out
as a protest movement in 1946 against alien rule like many other

I
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African parties, later assumed a political monopoly over the
country,

In order to wipe out tribalism no electoral district

was permitted to' be congruent with a single ethnic group. With
22
enlarged constituencies the result is that representatives
concentrate their appeal on occupational groups instead of
appealing to tribal slogans.

Although the supporters of the

one party system claim that it is broad-based, there is too
much coercion of political disfenters, especially those who
come from a particular geographical region and represent mi
norities in a clandestine way.

Wnatever the advantages of a

one-party system are from the standpoint of visible unity,
there is much curtailment of civil liberties.

Moreover, it

is tantamount to the supremacy of the elite over the uneducated
mass.

Whether a one-party system will effectively produce

national consciousness in some of the African countries which
may adopt such a system is not easy to predict at this time.

i '

The state is identified with the party and usually with a
single charismatic leader, who, given political realities, may
be deposed by a coup.

In any case, the attempt to structure

national consciousness on a single political party ignores
other factors which may in time endanger national unity.
It seems that the European powers may to some extent be

22

A.R. Zolberg, 'One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast'
Princeton University Press 1964 •. Twentieth century' Africa by
P.J.M. McEwan, (Oxford University Press 1968, London> p. 31.
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blamed for ushering in the form of party politics which the
Africans now ha.ve.

Throughout t.he colonial period the vote

was restricted to urbanized Africans; only on the verge of
.

I

independence were most African men and women enfranchised.

\

The Africans who since pre-colonial times had listened with

I'

uncritical obedience to their chiefs and elders were suddenly

\

exposed to parliamentary democracy.

:

The party slogans and

election campaigns had tended to reawaken in Africans a kind
of traditional war spirit that regards another party as an arch
enemy who must be eliminated.

Thus in nearly all African

countries members of the opposition \V'ere suppressed by the
parties in power.

IntUgerla both in the regions and in the

federal. government opposition members have faced high-handed
treatment by the ruling parties.

I~

Ghana, Dr. Nkrumah and

the Convention Peoples Party held Dr. J. B. Danquah, a presi
dentia1 rival, in jail under the Preventive Detention Acts.
He died there.

In Sierra Leone, on the eve of independence

!

j

.

II

in 1961 members of the African Peoples Party were jailed to
prevent disruption of the independence ceremony.

Members of

the opposition are frequently regarded as enemies of the
nation state; as a result some African countries have resorted
to a one-party system.

Most of the ruling parties in many

African countries remain constantly in power, rather than
alternating with the party of opposition.

In Ethiopia Emperor

Haile Se1assie is the state and he does not even allow the
formation of any party.

In Liberia, 'President Tubman is a

\

'
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lifetime president.

It is striking to remark

t~at

neither of

these countries was ever ruled by any colonial power for any
significant period of time; nonetheless, they show the trend of
government peculiar to other African countries.

In Kenya, the

Kenya African National Union has ruled the country since 1961
without any change of hands.

From 1955 to 1966 the Nigerian

government was dominated by the Northern Peoples' Congress.
Ruling parties ordinarily do everything possible to perpetuate
themselves, thus causing frustration muong the other political
parties which desire to be in the state house.

In so far as

party politics heighten tribal rivalry and insofar as most of
the political parties are regionally based, the tendency of
the ruling party to entrench itself in power obstructs
national unity.

Perhaps this weakening of national conscious

ness would not occur if the government were broad based and
if the ruling party were not to deny governmental amenities
to opposition areas.

As a matter of· fact, most of the oppo

sition parties would like to criticize the government and yet
at the same time they would like to be in the government.

The

late Prime Minister of Nigeria, Sir Abubakar Tafewa Be1ewa put
it in this way:
In Nigeria, no party can agree to be in opposition
for long. A political opposition in the Western
accepted sense is a luxury that we cannot afford ••••
The trouble is that the Nigerian member of Parliament
wants to criticize the government and to be in it at
the same time. Democracy, democracy--what is it?
There is American democracy, British democracy--why
not a Nigerian democracy? I wish we could find that~3
23

West Africa, No. 2539 (January 29, 1966) pp. 113-14.
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Th.us 1t ca.n be seen that it 15 not really party polltics
as such that should be held accountable for national disunity,
but it is actually how the
and apply it.

Africa~s

understand party politics

It is true that party politics came indirectly

with the European powers but for years the colonial powers
24
looked with jaundiced eye on the formation of political parties.
!-iost of the African political parties developed out of protest
movements against alien rule.

In Kenya the protest movement
24a
nlanifested itself in the Mau Mau uprising led by the Kikuyu
people.

The result was to deprive the Kikuyu of open political
,25
organizations as long as emergency regulations were in effect.
In Madagascar ,the Madagascar Nationa,l Movement (HORM) was

proscribed in 1948 because of its agitation against the ties
between the island and France.

The'Rassemblement Democratique

Africain (RDA) of the Ivory Coast faced colonial harassment
sj.nce the party wanted

colonia1,go~ernment

citizenship rights of Africans.

to respect the

In 1955 the Union of Cameroon

Peoples advocated the reunification and independence of the
24

In 1940 the Kenya colonial government suppressed the
formation of Kikuyu Central Association. In Nigeria in April
1950 the Nigeria colonial government disbanded the ziklst
Movement although in May it came out with a new name; the
Freedom Movement.
'
24a
The Kikuyu,people revolted,against the European
settlers because the Kikuyu land was taken away, and as such
the Kikuyu were deprived of coffee farming. The revolt lasted
from 1950-56.
25
'The emergency was declared in October 1952 and lasted
till October 1960.
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divided Cameroons; the party was asked to disband by the ,French
The two major colonial powers in Africa

colonial government.

at first did not look favorably on the formation of political
parties; and only during the interim period before independence
were they allowed to function.as political parties per sea But
in the formation the political

l'

pa~ties

became regionalized and

I

tribalistic; and all too often in ithe application of party
politics oppression and violation of civil liberties occur.
Consequently disillusionment and disenchantment engulf the
elements which are not
fest frustration

OIl

,a

part of the ruling clique.

The mani

the part of the·minor parties endangers

national unity, and the ruling party's attempt to uproot these
splinter parties deepens the polarization.
Let us turn from the political history, regionalized as
it is, to an explanation of the geographic distribution of
population as a potential threat to Nigerian unity.

During

the 1962-63 census the population of Nigeria was 55.7 million,
distributed as follows:

Northern Nigeria, 29.8 million;

Eastern Nigeria, 12.4 million; Western Nigeria, 10.3 million;
Midwestern

~igeria,

Lagos, 675,000.

2.5 million and the Federal territory of

The area of Nigeria comprises 356,699 square

miles divided as follows: Northern Nigeria 281,182 square
miles; Eastern Nigeria, 29,484 square miles; Western Nigeria
including the Midwest, 45,376 square miles, and the Federal
territory of Lagos, 27 square miles.

Nigeria has an average

density of 164 persons per square mile.

The North has 106
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persons to th.e square mile; while the: vlest
has 282 persons per square mile.

il1.clu6i~g

the Midwest

In the East density reaches

419 persons to the square mile, while the concentrated urban

population of Lagos hits 25,000 persons per square mile.

It

is clear that population density is much greater in Southern
Nigeria--Lagos, West, Midwest and East--than in the North.
In a few areas especially in the South the population
density of 400 to 500 per square mile has reached the
limit of what the land can support under the presen~
agricultural methods and here population pressures
have resulted in ••• migration of the inhabitants. On
the other hand, there are wide areas, as in the Northern
Region ••• which are thinly populated or virtually
uninhabited.26a
This pressure on the land is further complicated by
differentiating land laws.

In some parts of Southern Nigeria

customary law recognizes the right of permanent alienation;
in the North all land is held by the government as a trust
for the native population.

NOll-Northerners are strangers

who must obtain the right of occupancy.

The possibility of

using the North as an outlet for the heavy over-population in
the South, and especially the East, was in a way checkmated by
permitting the Southerners to live only in Sabon-Gari without
full absorption into the body politic of the North.

This

containment of non-Northerners on the periphery of Northern
towns frustrated the settlers who found themselves treated as
infidels.

These measures in practice undermined Nigerian

citizenship.
26aThe Ee·onomie Develbpm~nt: ·~:f:··Ni9'·~iia. Report for the
International Bank for Reconstructiol1 and Development (The
John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1955) pp. 10-11.

;
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The concentration of population in the South to a certain
extent may be attributed to the British administration.

For

when ,the British administrators first arrived they settled
along the coast and developed the coastal towns such as Lagos,
Port Harcourt and Calabar.
the coastal towns inland.

Roads and railways radiated from
Thus regional inequities of popu-

lation density emanated from European coastal development.
until the problem of inter-regional settlement is given badly
needed legislative attention, population pressures will
continue to feed regional animosities.
The population census of Nigeria has been given much
political significance, for representation in the Federal House
of Representatives was based on geographic distribution of
population.

The Federal House of Representatives had 312

members. Out of this number 167 seats were allocated to the
26
North. The East had 70 sea'ts while 57 went to the West. The
Midwest was allocated 14 seats and the Federal capitol of
Lagos had 4.

While other areas in Nigeria practiced adult

sufferage, the North excluded women from voting and holding
office.

The population census of 1962-63 itself produced a

series of controversies and inter-regional conflicts.
Federal Government

whi~h

The

controlled the population count was

sued by the East regional government.

The

~uit

failed because

26
In 1945 the Northern leaders had demanded representation equal to the combined seats of the East and West.
Between 1945 and 1953 ,the House had 148 members. Between
1954 and 1956 it had 194; and between 1957 and 1966 it had
312.
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the court -claimed that it had no j urisdiction
issues.

O~ler

census

This helped increase the loss of faith in the nation

by some Eastern leaders.

On the basis of the population census

majority government for the whole of Nigeria was decided and
the decision was in fa'lor of the North.

Northern control of

the Federal Government was difficult for some Southerners to
accept because of alleged inflated figures from the North, and
above all, because-of the lack of fairness of elections in the
region.

Although the Southern politicians accused the Northern

ers of the 1962-3 census inaccuracies, it must be emphasized
that all the regional governments of Nigeria manipulated the
census figures of their regions.to gain more seats in the Fed
eral Legislature, and all the regions controlled their elections
in order to maintain the status quo.
It is clear that the distribution of popu.lation in Nigeria
has been much politicised and it is a source of conflict, more
especially since the region with the most numerous inhabitants
has obtained a predominating position of power despite the
fact that the rest of the country is more highly developed in
terms of assimilation of western ideas.

In other words, the

problem is the inability of the relatively few intellectuals
concentrated in the South to control the government of the
country.

In some other African countries, such as Kenya, the

political power and numerical strength of the majority tribe,
.
the Kikuyu, are also reflected in the composition of the
nation's elite.

The Hausa-Fulani control of the government in

-----------------~------.-------
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Nigeria reflects the concept of majority rule but does not en
tirely do away with the question of whether the un-Westernized
mass should sacrifice its sovereign will to an intellectual
oligarchy.

From this standpoint the unity of Nigeria is hin

dered not by the geographical distribution of population as
such, but rather because the majority exercised political
power without corresponding Westernization.
To some extent Northern control of the Federal Govern
ment because of its population strength can be blamed on
policies of the English colonial administration.

In 1945

Sir Arthur Richards formulated the Richards constitution which
for the first time brought the South and the North together in
one central legislature.

In the draft constitution thirty

seats were proposed for the No':r;-th while twenty-two seats each
were allocated for the West and the East.

Although the draft

Riehards Constitution took into account the numerical strength
of the North, the Northerners demanded a representation equal
to that of both the East and the West.

The issue of repre

sentation in the Central Legislature became a major disagree
27
ment and almost brought work of the General Conference to a
standstill.

The Governor-General bypassed the stalemated

General Conference; he submitted the problem created by the
Northern demands to the existing Legislative Council of Nigeria,

27
The members were no~inated by the governor and the
administrators of different provinces. In addition, there were
members of the Legislative Cou!'l.cil.

I,
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the

me~bership

of which had an official British majority.

The

Legislative Council decided in favor of the Northern demand
and thus sold out the South to the North.

The Richards Consti

tution and the Legislative Council of Nigeria were, it appears
on hindsight, misdirected in allocating more seats to any
region of Nigeria.
28
Between 1903 and 1943 the population of Nigeria was
counted only in the major towns; and in 1953 when the count
was spread to the countryside the people refused to cooperate
29
and.returned low figures. While in. 1963 when the post-inde
pendence population census was made there was much exaggeration
because of the political campaign and the advantages a high
return might have.

Thus in 1945·the determination of repre

sentation according to the population census could not
accurately be accomplished.

The allocation of a majority of

the seats in the Central Legislature to the North allowed the
North to develop as a strong regional bloc in opposition to
the Southern forces.

It also created a precedent that the North

would scarcely relinquish and which the South felt forced to
offset.
28

In 1929 a rumor that a census was to be taken in the
East produced the 'Aba Riot'~
29
The people associated head count with taxation and the
greater the number of people returned in a home the more tax
money to be collected from the head of the household. Also,
there was a superstitious belief that people who are counted
may die. Furthermore, there was no program to educate the
people.
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Regional differences in the acquisition of Western ideas
act as a hindrance to any general cultural assimilation and
practice of democratic principles in Nigeria.

In 1926, barely

twenty-six years after Great Britain had assumed direct admin
istration of Nigeria, there were 138,249 pupils in the primary
schools and 518 in the secondary schools of Southern Nigeria;
while in the North there were only 5,210 in the primary
schools.

No secondary schools were established in the region.

By 1947, two years after the introduction of the Richards Con
stitution, there were 538,391 primary school pupils and 9,567
pupils in the secondary schools of Southern Nigeria, compared
with 70,962 pupils in the primary schools and 251 in secondary
30
schools in the North. The 1952 population census revealed that
there were 834,266 literates in roman script 'in the East;
769,933 in the West including Lagos, compared with only 250,707
in the North. The North also had 656,259 literates in Arabic
31
script. In 1963, three years after Nigeria had gained its in
dependence, Southern Nigeria registered 2,485,676 pupils in
primary schools and 231,161 in secondary and post-primary
institutions.

The North, on the other hand, had 410,706 pupils

30
,
, Annual Report, Colony of Southern Nigeria, 1906, p. 199 •
. Annual-'Report,Northern Nigeria., 1900-1911 •
. Afr~can' Education, (Oxford: Nuffield ~"oundation, 1954)
p.47-8o
31

.
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Population Census' of 'the We'stern'Re-gion' o'f' N'i-g'eri'a,' '1952
(Lagos: Government .Statistician, .1953-1954).. . . ......
Population Census of the Norther-n' Region' 'of' Ni-g'e'ria',1952
(Lagos: ~overnment Statistician, .19S2:::-n-S3Y •. ,
Po ulation Census of the E'astern Region' of' N'ige'ria,1953
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Lagos: Government tat~st~c~an,
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in primary schools and 20,312 in secondary and p6st-primary
schools, yet the North contains about 54 percent of the popu·
lation of the country.

Only about 25 percent of the literate

population resides in the North.

This variation in the distri

bution of educated population is an important fact to be
considered, not simply as populatipn count that has favored
Northern control of the Federal government.

From this high

rate of literate population in the South it can be inferred
that there has been a change to a money economy, more accumu
lation of western technology and a high urban-rural ratio,
and perhaps, the rise of a new middle class.

The per capita

income in the various regions in Nigeria confirms this im
pression:

$95.20 in the West; $47 •.60 in the North, and $58.80

in the Eastern region.
detribali~ation.

These factors are likely to produce

The continuation of unweakened tribal organi

zatJ.on in certain areas of the country in political association
with areas of more rapid modernization clearly affects Nigerian
unJ.ty.
Perhaps in this context the British administration can
be criticized.

In colonial times about 98 percent of the

schools in Nigeria were established by missionaries, and about
97 percent of all educated persons 'in the country went through
mission schools.

But in January, 1900, when Lord Lugard became

the High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria he insisted on main
taining all the pledges of

~he

Royal Niger Company.

Accordingly,

. Christian missionaries were not allowed to proselytize in the
North.

In 1902 the High Commissioner issued the following
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report:
I am myself of the opinion that it is unwise and unjust
to force missions upon the Mohammedan population, for
it must be remembered i:hat without the moral support of
the Government these missions would not be tolerated.
And if they are established by order of the Government
the people have some cause to disbelieve the emphatic
pledges I have g'iven them that their religion shall in
no way be interfered with.32
Interestingly enough, the Colonial Office in 1917
restated the policy that anything that threatened the Islamic
religion in the, North endangered the authority of the emirs
and thus undermined the system of Indirect Rule.
Christian missionaries from
by the

Moharr~edan

th~

By barring

North unless they were invited

emirs, the North was procluded from coming

in contact with European culture in the form of western edu
cation.

Yet these Northerners later had to share and to

interpret the complex and alien Richards Constitution of 1945.
Such differences in the reception of western ideas, largely
the effect of missionary enterprise, has contributed to
regionalism in Nigeria.

The failure of Great Britain to

encourage religious conversions in Northern Nigeria in line
with the rest of the country can perhaps be

rega~ded

as a

hindrance to national unity caused by the European powers.
The British colonial policy did not interfere with native
religion unless it involved cannibalism and human sacrifice.
The Islamic religion prevalent in Northern Nigeria did not
affect law and order, the most essential concern of the European
powers.

In fact,

t~aditional

religion and culture of the North

32Margery Perham,' N·~t·i';~···A~i~i~t,~~t'ion 'in Ni'ge-ria (Oxford
University Press, London, 1937) p. 286.
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were steadying influences favorable to the European presence.
The North may seem detached from the South in the assimilation
of western ideas but it was not exempted from the economic and
political objectives of colonial rule.
There are many differences in development and urbanization
which deepen the forces of regionalism.

Northern Nigeria has

been fortunate to possess such extractive industries as the
tin-columbite mines of Jos and the iron of Lokoja.

Kano has

been the hub of commercial activities and light industries of
the North.

In the South there are the oil wells of the Midwest

and the East,' and there is also the coal of Enugu, although it
is of poor quality.

In the generation and distribution of

electricity the South has such centers as Lagos, Abeokuta,
Ibadan,Oshogbo, Benin, Sapele, Warri, Port Harcourt, Aba,
Calabar, Onitsha, Oji River, Enugu ,and Abakaliki.

On the other

hand, the giant North has eight locations at Kaduna, Jos, Yola,
Maiduguri, Zaria, Kano, Katsina and Sokoto.

The economic

development of the North is not comparable to its size; nor
does it match the progress in the southern areas.

Thus the

growth of towns and urbanization which follows an economic
development has been limited.

Economic problems become nearly

insoluble because of the conflict of interests imbedded in
regional politics.

The Federal Economic Council was supposed

to handle such problems, but in 1963 a decision whether to
locate an iron and steel industry either at Lokoja, an iron
mine in the North, or at Onitsha, a populous commercial center
in the East, could not be reached because of the political
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publicity given the issue by the premiers of the-East and North.
Some would gladly blame the colonial powers for the
various differences in development characteristically found in
most of the African countries.

The European powers

develope~

those areas of their colonies where either agricultural products
or mineral resources could be obtained.

After all, the supply

of raw materials was one of the chief reasons for acquiring a
colony.

The European powers therefore tended to develop those

sections which would provide maximum resources or support a
self-sustained economy_

But African leaders since independence

was· gained have concentrated development in those areas which
had already been developed by the colonial powers, and they
amplify existing disparities.

In some African countries

development becomes part of the spoils system, rewarding those
areas which voted for a government party.

For

exa~ple,

in

Nigeria many of the minority areas which did not support the
ruling regional parties were denied economic opportunities.
Disenchantment has resulted from the failure of the ruling
parties to live up to their pro-independence pledges of 'Life
33

Abundance' promised to the masses.
-

Life Abundance failed to

.

spread out to the lower ranks of society because of the way
governmental favors were manipulatad by the ruling party.
is inevitable that political

consid~ration

It

should enter into

decisions concerning economic development but its role should
33

It was the party slogan of the Action Group which ruled
Western Nigeria.
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be restricted.

Too often some of the ruling parties employ the

location of industry and amenities as a means of winning votes
from the electorate.
At this point we shall turn our attention to the problem
of moral values in differen.tiating attitudes of Nigerians
towards fellow members and their country as the greatest force
working against integration.

In short, in nearly all the

African countries there has been moral erosion and the develop
ment of differing attitudes which retard the growth of national
unity.

Of the twenty-eight black African countries which have

gained independence about twenty-four have experienced either
a successful coup or an abortive one.

In a typical military

takeover, the army declares it.will rid the country of tyranny,
bribery, corruption and nepotism, yet it does not easily do so.
Where civilian governments are in operation, some members of
parliament try to use their influence on the government for
their

o~m

personal advantage, justifying that they had spent

a huge sum of money during electioneering.

Applicants for

government jobs often have to buy their positions from the
ministry controlled by a politician.

Many government and

corporation employees feel that if a person wants speedy and
efficient service such a person should make some sacrifices.
The President, the Prime Minister and the Ministers' tribesmen
are always favored in job opportunities; and at times a job
vacancy may not be announced until a tribal member to fill such
a post is found.

As a result tribal rivalry is fed on the

least powerful tribes, and the unity of all the tribal groups
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stands in doubt.
In Nigeria, as well as in other African countries, there
is little or no sense of common nationality among the citizens.
Nigerians still regard themselves as aliens in their own coun
try and strangers among their own people.

A Nigerian finds it

hard to think of his country as a greater unit than his native
region, and his country to him is not as important

a~

his tribe.

Normally either the tribe or the clan is the object of an
individual's greatest loyalty.
To some extent these problems of changing attitudes and
. moral corrosion may be blamed on the European powers which
colonized Africa.

The traditional mores of the Africans were

broken down by the introduction of the Western culture,
especially by ideas of equality and a questioning of tradi
tional deference to age.

The traditional African society in

which a person's actions and deeds were regulated by public
approval and ancestral spirits has been devalued by European
cultural attitudes.

An

African once knew that when he broke

his society's custom he faced either a taboo or a series of
rituals to appease the gods.

But

nO~7

urban centers--out

growths of European colonialism--serve as a haven and a hideout
for such offenders against traditional customs.

An

African

who formerly felt himself to be at the mercy of his ancestral
spirits and the earth deity, who lived in constant fear of the
.
supernatural often now has become a convert to European
Christian religion which emphasizes the accountability of the
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individual conscience to Gcd.

Thus the individual priesthood

or the individual direct communication "lith his Christian god
disrupts the community ethics.

An

African nO\-l has to bear his

moral burden arising from eith.er his actions or inaction him
self.

He is liberated from the belief that his moral actions

would either be a shame, or a source of glory to his community.
An

African's life was once submerged in and sustained by the

group, but nO\,l individual life increasingly overshadows
ccmmunal life.

Although many an African was intimidated by

the fear of hell and heaven to accept the European religion,
it is really the African's desire for the attainment of
modernity in his life that is producing moral change.

An

lJ.fl:ican accepte.d Christianity he:ca\.1.se he either wanted to

fr~e hilnself from a tradition~l authority or he wanted to
ac~uire

prestige and to gain material henefits.

But African

Ch;istians easily and speedily return to their fetish practi.ces
if,they feel that misfortune has befallen them.

It is true

that the different Christian denominations have produced
differing attitudes among the Africans since they could not
marry and associate with non-members of the sects.

But in

pre-colonial times Africans did not marry'I out.side their tribe
or clan and members of some African cults did not associate
with non-members.

Thus the

va~iation

in attitudes of Africans

towards one another is partly caused by European factors and
partly sharpened by the African conditions.

A member of the

African elite simply because he had got a financial opportunity
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to acquire western education becomes snobbish toward nonwesternized Africans.

When there is a large concentration of

western educated men in one tribe the disintegrative effect on
national unity is untold.

Any such claim of superiority is

likely to be resisted by other tribes who compose the nation
state.

Traditional African values limited social contacts to
34

people of unquestionable character 'and the unacceptable be
havior of a given person could be transferred to his extended
family and community.

If the unacceptable code of conduct is

generalized to t.ake in either a clan or a tribe the. unity of
. the country is thus affected.

It oeems that this African

attitude has a ·great disruptive influence on national unity
since Africans would cooperate with a people whom they like,
and the building of national unity needs the cooperation of
all sections of the nation.
National unity has meant different thirtgs to the various
groups that advocate it.

The National Cour.lcil of Nigeria

Citizens championed one Nigeria insofar as L:.s members would
identify their tribal group interest with Nigerian nat.ionalism,
and as far as most of its trading members would move unmolested
in any part of the country.

To the Action Group of Nigeria,

unity was embodied by the creation of nu..rnerous federated states.
And to the Northern Peoples' Congress the unity of Nigeria was
subject to the idea of Northern hegiemOl1Y.
I

34

.

The westernized

I

A thief, an adulterer, a trlcder who cheats, a witch
doctor, a person who has money by grunbling, a person who reveals
a secret and young men who fight copstantly with their parents
or any other elderly person were no~ associated.with.

...... ;

,

I

'I
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elders have not decided on what elements of the colonial life
they want either to adopt or adapt.

In Northern Nigeria the

people demanded parliamentary representation but the Northern
women were not emancipated as were their counterparts in the
South.

In Southern Nigeria 'the elite talk of majority rule

but they opposed Northern dominance.

Som~

of the Nigerian

political leaders preached the politics of power and the
35

protection of their domain instead of the politics of national
unity_

Divisiveness has constantly plagued Nigerian national

consciousness.
British' colonial administrative practice was responsible
to some degree ·for the regi.onalism that plagues Nigeria.

The

first British administration was the Consulate established in
1849 for the Bights of Benin and Biafra, with headquarters en
the Spanish island of Fernando Po.

Later, John Deecroft moved

the headquarters to Calabar which was located within the Oil
36
Rivers Protectorate--an area of land east of the Niger covering
35

In 1963 Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the President of the coun
try, toured the North and remarked on the plight of the
Northerners. He was criticizeu by the Northerners for making
such remarks. Dr. Michael Okpara, the P:r:emier of Eastern
Nigeria, announced a tour of the West but the Wostern House of
Chiefs passed a resolution banning Okpara from the region, but
he went into the West.
36

This was an area where the livelihood of the people
depended on the production of I,regetable cil--palm oil--and
the oil has been the main export of the area. The trade in
palm oil replaced the trade in slaves after its abolition in
1833.

I
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the Delta &ld extending to Calabar. The Oil RivQrs Protector
37
ate, established in 1885, at first had a separate consular
administration but in 1893 the Oil Rivers area was given a new
name, the Niger coast Protectorate, and extended to cover an
area west of the Niger.
general.

It was also administered by a consular

West of the Niger Coast Protectorate was Lagos, which

in 1853 was created as a separate consular area in an effort to
control the high incidence of slave trading.

Within the Niger

Coast Protectorate there was no uniform progress in
trative organization.

ad~inis

The clan system worked better in Warri

and parts of Calabar than among the Ibo of Owerri and Onitsha
where the people were not used to being grouped within a large
administ:t:ative unit.

The Niger Coast Protectorate, which

extended on both sides of the river Niger and was established
particularly to look after the interest of the European
traders, became the Southern Protectorate in 1900 under the
rule of a governor.

The Southern Protectorate with a population

of about 8.5 million in 1921 out of the total of 18,765,000
for the whole country, had its own separate government depart
ments.

In 1939 the Southern Protectorate was split into the

East and the West Provinces with a population of 4.8 million
and 3 million respectively.

Each was separatety administered,

and the separate identity of the two regions thus emerged.
37

The Berlin Act of 1885 declared the Niger with all its
tributaries an international waterway and many British and
other European traders converged in the area.

,I
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However, the British administrator of each

9!.'Ctlf·

was subject to the chief administrator

the entire country.

f:o:r:

of provinces

Lagos, which had been declared a separate consular area
.in 1853,

bec~ne

a colony in December le61.

The Yoruba ruling

chief, Docemo, ceded full sovereig:qty to the British govern
ment.

Lagos was colonized under the British lat" n,nd was

administered directly by the Sritish officials.

Y'lhile in the

Southern provinces the natives were British protected persons,
the residents of Lagos were regarded

ClS

British subjects.

In

1866 the administration of Lagos "'las directed from Sierra

.
Leone; then in 1874 the administration of Lagos was merged with
the colony of the Gold Coast, nm., Ghana.

Between 1881 and

1885, the inr..abitants of Lagos protested against the loss of

their separate administration.

As a result the administra'cion

of Lagos was separated from the Gold Coast iu 1886.

In 1906,

the Colony of Lagos, despite a very different s1stem of govern
ment, was merged with the Southern Protectorate, the seat of
government for which yas at Calabar.

In spite of the amalgam

ation, Lagos was ruled by a separate administrator while the
Southern Protectorate too had its own commissioner.

But the

two administrative areas were placed under a governor, Sir
Walter Egerton.

The colony of Lagos continued its separate

administration as a territorial area until the Constitution
of 1951 which made it a part of the Western Region.

In 1954,

Lagos was separated from the West and declared the Federal
Capital.

The separate status of Lagos reached its climax in
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May 1967 when Lagos became one of the twelve states created by
General Gowon.
If Lagos and the Southern Protectorate revealed differ
ences in administration, the North presents yet another con
trast to confirm Britishadro.inistrative regionalism in Nigeria.
The government of the Northern Provinces from 1886 to 1899
was the legatee of the Royal Niger Company.

Hith the revocation

of the company's charter in 1900, a British High Commissioner
assumed the cont.roJ. of the North.

Between 1900 and 1906 the

High Commissioner, Lord Lugard, conducted a series of wars to
. pacify the North.

Even though Northern Nigeria "'as occupied

by military conquest, the High Commissioner introduced Indirect
Rule in the region.

From 1900 to 1914 Northern Nigeria enjoyed

its independent administration under: the commissioner's super
vision.
In 1914 the Colony of Lagos and the Southern Protectorate,
and the Northern Protectorate, were amalgamated under a single
governor-general, Lord Lugard, previously the High Commissioner
of the North.

Perhaps because of the First World War and the

resultant shortage in staff and finance, perhaps to coordinate
the economy of the two territories, a unification program was
undertaken.

Yet in spite of the amalgamation each protectorate

had its own lieutenan·t governor.

The amalga.rr:a tion was not very

effective for by 1923 the medical and education departments
were still not unified.

It was only in 1933 that the police

departments of the two areas were unified.

In 1922 a Legis
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lative Council was establish.ed.
Chamber of

Co~~erce

The President of the Kana

was one of its

merr~ers.

But strikingly

enough, the Ilegislative Counc:i.1 only made legislation for the
South; and legislation for the North remained in the hands of
the lieutenant governor.
four administrative units:

In 1929, Nigeria was divided into
the Colony, the Western, the

Eastern and the Northern Provinces, each administered by a
Commissioner.

In 1945 the Richards Constitution strengthoned

the regional grouping by giving each unit fairly broad powers.
However, the Richards constitution brought all the regional
members into a Central Legislature which c.lpproved all bills
and financial legislation for the whole country.
Although regionalism may have

been in em embryonic

stage, the Macpherson Constitution of 1951 and its revision of
1954 gave the regions greater autonomy.

The British government

based the political unity of the country on the three component
autonomous regions.

It is this three-regional structure of

government which has proved so difficult in practice.

Perhaps

the unity of Nigeria would have been better developed if more
states had been created.

Chief Awolowo, the ex-Premier of

Western Nigeria could not justify the arbitrary grouping of the
federal government, instead, he advocated the grouping of
38

Nigeria into various autonomous· states on an ethnic basis.
38

Awo, The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo.
(Cambridge University Press, 1960) pp. 174-76.
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For more than iif,teen years some Nigeric,ns have blamerj the
colonial administration for the constitution \-Thich failed to
provide more states as the Achilles' heel of national unity.
In May 1967 General Gowon decreed the creation of twelve states
in Nigeria, but by doing so he helped to precipitate the Civil
War since Eastern Nigeria (Biafra) was opposed to the dismem
bering of its region.
British

colo~ial

policy and administration varied as

governments and administrators changed hands in London.
Except for brief interludes under Gladstone who limited
imperialistic'designs, the period from 1885 to 1905 saw Lords
Salispury and Rosebery as Prime Ministers, both strongadvo
cates of imperialistic expansion.

Thus private trading

companies were chartered to acquire and rule some foreign
territories.

The Royal Niger Company and the. British Consul

ruled various territories in Nigeria from 1885 to 1900.

I·t

was ,not easy for the interest of the trading firms to be en
tirely eliminated when the British government took over direct
responsibility for the various territories.

Lord Lugard, an

agent of the Royal Niger Company, a military commander of the
company's armed forces--the R()yal West African Frontier Force-
became the High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria 1900-1906
which had been the main domain of the company.

Between 1906

and 1914, the Liberals under Balfour and Asquith took over
British government and reorganization of Nigeria resulted.
1906 Lagos was unified with the Southern Protectorate and in

In

! ! II

!

II
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1914 the Northern Protectorate and the South were amalgamated.
It seems that the amalgamation on the part of Great Britain was
effected because the idea of free trade was dying and British
trade was facing increased difficulties in European markets.
Britain had to adjust its colonial conditions to make the
situation favorable to her town-bred middle class who depended
on trade and industries.

Lord Lugard became the governor-

general of Nigerial9l2-l9l8, to implement the unification
program.

It seems that Lord Lugard's objective was to foster

law and order, which in turn would encourage profitable trade.
Lord Lugard did not use the system in effect in the southern
protectorate--direct British administration in the Colony of
Lagos, district and county councils on an English model in most
places in the West and in the East.

He admired the Northern

system of Indirect Rule and introduced it to the South.

By

S9 doing he ignored the Westernized Africans in the South.
39

Perhaps he was disdainful of the..'U because of their demands,
and perhaps there were not enough Westernized Africans to
assume ruling responsibility of the whole country.

In any case,

Lord Luga.rd appealed to the traditl.onal rulers ,V'ho were in the
majority and who could foster stability to promote trade,
justice and peace for Britain.

The future national unity of

Nigeria was affected even at that early time because of the
differences between the forces of change manifested in the
39

The inhabitants of Lagos demanded a separate adminis
tration from Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast.

I'
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Westernized Africans in the South and the forces·of stability
embodied in the Islamic leaders of the North.
From 1900 to 1914 Nigeria was not administered as one
country, largely due to the continuing effect of its piecemeal
acquisition.

Between 1914 and 1951 the country was ruled

under a unitary form of government symbolized by the Governor
General, one budget, one legislature and one civil service.
But between 1951 and 1959 the strong central government was
dropped in favor of the federal structure which the country
still maintains.

Thus Nigeria has undergone various changes

of government since 1900 which have considerable bearing on
present problems of unity and disunity.

At the same time,

the regionalism in Nigeria must be examined in the totality
of the Nigerian society.

In 1953 a riot broke out in Kano

between some Northerners and Southerners simply because some
Northern members of Parliament were booed at Lagos; and an
opportunity for revenge occurred when a Southern politician
announced a tour of the North.

In 1965 the academic community

of the University of Lagos witnessed a bitter quarrel among
the university professors because an Ibo vice-chancellor,
professor Eni Njoku, was replaced by Professor S. O. Biobaku,
a Yoruba.

Thus in all segments of Nigerian society there are

regional and tribal attitudes which more than anything else
weaken national unity.

It is really the lack of good human

relations or good neighborliness which
the country.

This is the role of

oth~r

paraly~ed

the unity of

African states too.

}
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In Kenya, Uganda, and Chad various ethnic groups are very
sensitive towards one another.
Some writers have blamed the European powers for having
created European nation states in Africa, instead of buildinq
tribal states as a more viable basis for independent existence.
But a study of the African tribes would reveal that some of
the tribes are not homogeneous except in name.

Within the

Fulani tribe for example there are such sub-units as the Cow
and the Town FUlani.

In the Ibo tribe there are such sub

divisions as Nnwa, Abiriba, Oni tsha and O\-;erri peoples.

The

Yoruba tribe has sub-groups such as the Egbas and the Ijebus.
Sometimes there may be quarrels and fighting between differing
dialect groups of the same tribe.,
Aside from such lack of homogeneity wi.thin a tribe, a
tribal state would not have served as the real objective of
having a colony_

The imperialistic powers were not to all

intents and purposes to build a political s'tate, but simply to
organize an economic area.

The larger the size of a common

market, the better it was.

If the idea of building a political

state ever manifested itself in the British colonial plan in
Africa, the British regarded it as a gradual approach.

The

French regarded their colonies as extensions of metropolitan
France with the goal of assimilating the natives.

The Belgians

took their colonies as possessions that could only enjoy the
benevolence of the Belgian king.

The Spaniards, the Germans

and the Portuguese looked upon their African colonies as
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natural resources which were to be exploited.
fore be emphasized that it

ltlaS

It must there

for ccmmercl.al interest that the

territories were first occupied, and most of the countries were
acquired either by private traders, missionaries and chartered
companies.

The metropolitan government involvement followed

rather later and sometimes quite reluctantly.
To some extent the two major coloni.al powers attempted
to wlify some of their territories economically.

French West

Africa, which comprised Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Guinea,
Dahomey Soudan, Niger, Mallretania, and Upper Volta, was ad
ministered as a federation after 1904.

The governor-general

who was responsible to the Minister of Colonies, had his
headquarters in Dakar in Senegal.

Until 1945 the French

monetary system circulated throughout the Federation, but 1n
December 1945 the Federation issued its own currency--the
F~ench

Colony of Africa franc.

This was a result of the

deterioration of the French franc during the Second World War
and it was essential to save the economy of the colony.

The

Federation had its own central bank in Senegal which issued
paper currency for the area.

With independence of each of the

countries, the common currency has been withdrawn.
Great Britain, on the other hand, failed to federalize
either its West or East African territories under a governor
general.

British West Africa, which consisted of the Gambia,

Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast and Nigeria, used a common paper
currency--the West African Currency Note.

To improve production
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of agricultural raw material2 a West African Institute for Oil
Palm Research was established at Benin in Nigeria for all the
colonies.

After independence of each of the countries the

former British West Africa decided to maintain the Research
Center but at the same time they withdrew the circulation of
the common currency.

At any rate, an examination of the situ

ation in the former colonies reveals that in spite of all the
diversities there are certain socio-economic forces favoring
unity.
In Nigeria, the various regions of the country are well
linked by means of communication.

The Niger-Benue Rivers with

their tributaries provide important water transportation routes
to the various sections of the countrJ, though rapids and
waterfalls on the Niger-Benue obstruct free movement on some
reaches of these rivers.
the South.

The Niger-Benue link the North to

The military headquarters of the Royal Niger

Company was established at Lokoja, the confluence of the Niger
Benue, while the trading center of the company was located
southward on the Niger at Asaba.

Burutu and Warri on the Niger

Delta became headquarters of such trading firms as the United
African Company and John Holt and Company.

Baro on the Niger

in Northern Nigeria was developed as a port to link the various
trading areas of the South witrr the North.
As trade proceeded inland railway lines were constructed

to link the inland markets.
the coastal towns.

The railway system radiated from

In 1896 the

~onstruction

of the first rail
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way line from Lagos to Oshogbo, a cocoa area in Yorubaland, was
begun.

This Western rail\'lay syst.em joins Minna, a gold mining

town with Baro, a port center in the North.

By 1911 this rail

way system reached Kano, the Northern market for peanu·ts, hides
and skins, and caravan trade.

East of the Niger from the port

town of Port Harcourt on the Niger delta, a railway line was
laid in 1912 to reach the coal mining town of Udi.

In 1927

the Eastern line was extended to J'os, the tin-colurnbi te mining
center in the North.

After the First World War the road system

as developed was an extension of the rail.way lines and in most
cases the roads intersect with the railway lines.
Apart from transporting the bulky products from one part
of the country to another, these lines of communication have
helped Nigerians and the administrative officials to move
from one part of the country to

thE:~

other.

This movement of

people is creating a social mix neN to Nigeria.

The communi

cation system encourages a large amount of internal trade
within the country.

Thus livestock, grains and cowpeas from

the North and the Middle Belt, kola nuts from the West, garri
and yams from the Middle Belt and the East circulate freely in
all part.s of the federation.

Tribal differences notwithstand

ing all the various regions of Nigeria are complementary to
one another in domestic marketihg.

With good means of communi

cation which each African country should list in its priorities
the social mobility would produce a mutual understanding to
speed up national consciousness.
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Many ne'll towns such as Jos, Kaduna, Enugu, Baro and Port
Harcourt were opened in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa by the
European powers, mostly as markets or administrative centers.
With the introduction of a money economy and the corresponding
preference for cash income, many Africans migrated to the
towns.

This movement to urban centers has promoted detribali

zation as well as urbanization.

A sense of national identity

is cultivated in the towns since members of many tribal groups
mingle there.

If many new towns were established, the pace of.

detribalization would quicken a resultant: growth of national
consciousness.

Of course, the influx of people into the towns

might also bring a high rate of unemployment and crime, but
these incidents should be regarded as a challenge.

Instead of

concentrat.in<,3' industries and development projects in the few
congested old towns some government projects could be used in
opening up new towns.

All sections of the community would

then benefit from governmental projects instead of only the
presently favored areas.
Through the efforts of the early missionaries, the
European powers had founded schools along the coastal and
riverine areas.

In French West Africa the Catholic mission

aries spearheaded education until 1903 when the church and the
state were separated in France.

In Nigeria, the Catholic

missionaries founded the first school at Lagos in 1844, while
the Church Missionary Society founded a school at Calabar in
the East in 1847.

At first the goal of European education was
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to enable the Africans to read and write and thus equip them
40

to serve as interpreters, teachers and clerks.

European edu

cation created certain common bonds among many Africans and it
served to engender national a'Vlareness.

Some educated Africans

may quarrel over appointments such as have been made at Lagos
univ-ersity, but education has allo\lled them to cross regional
lines and as a result these Africans are better able to under
stand other tribal·groups.

These educated Africans have

formed trade unions which are countrywide.

For an instance,

the .Nigerian Union of Teachers caters to the interest of all
teachers in the country.

With great advancement taking place

in education and with proper reorganization of education
towards national interests--instead of a tribal language,
French and English and other tribal languages should be taught
and African history should be developed--a new Nigerian pro
file can be given expression.

Maybe the new Nigerians will

even be able to modify the cake of custom that at times forces
the~

to marry within their own tribe.

In an attempt to weaken

social rigidity, marriage outside the tribe should be en
41
couraged, perhaps by means of preferential bride-price. The
European powers have created directly and indirectly some bonds
40

Originally these types of work were done by freed
slaves from Brazil and Sierra Leone.
41

Bride-price cannot be eliminated at the present rate
of literacy in Africa. Because of the high bride-price in
some areas some educated Africans prefer foreign wives.

.;
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.of union--the colonial rule, constitution making and inde
pendence of course, the slave trade which they accentuated,
legitimate trade and education which they activated, and the
resulting encouragement of soci.al mobility.

Political unity

is really the responsibility of the .i\f:cicans for the European
powers were not in Africa to build a nation-state which would
compete with the metropolitan country, but rather wanted
colonies to complement the mother country and serve its needs.

!

!

CHAP'l'ER IV
CONCI"USION
The European powers during their scramble for Africa
removed the old political formations based on ethnic group
ings and substituted almost everywhere nevi territorial
groupings.

The formation of territorial states satisfied the

need of European interest groups for la.rge markets and alse
corresponded with European conoeptions of government.
Sectionalism and particularism existed in the new

~erritorial

states but they did not affect European economic interests.
The change to money economy, and above all, the European's
military superiority, kept politIcal separateness at bay.
But the Second World War marked a new stage in the African's
contact with the Europeans and called in question the earlier
European superiority.

The self-determination clause contained

in President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points was echoed and
re-echoed by a small vanguard of African elite who were not
content to remain in a static position vis-a-vis the European.
The wave of demands for independence caught the European
powers relatively unprepared.

Bet".., een 1945 and 1946 France

by its Monnet Plan, Great Britain by its Colonial Development
Fund started more economic development for

th~ir

territorial
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market areas.

A political transformation took shape in Nigeria

in 1945 when the Richards Constitution was drawn up and the
North and the South for the first time were brought into one
Central Legislature.

France by. its constitution of 1946

allowed elected African natives from the colonies to sit in the
Constituent Assembly.

By 1956 the loi cadre launched French

African colonies on the way to internal autonomy within the
French Union.

To all intents and purposes it was the pressure

of events that forced the major European powers to prepare
their colonies for political independence.

It was really too

short a period of time for the African countries to acquire all
the mechanics of Western democracy or even to produce a
national consciousness.

Most of ·the colonies gained independ

ence between 1957 and 1963 when they had been ruled by foreign
powers for over fifty years.
It is true that the period since decolonization has also
been too short for the African countries to achieve national
unity, but all politico-socio-economic forces should be em
ployed by the African leaders with the goal of increasing
national unity.

A change of attitude is needed, especially in

light of the disparities existing in each of the countries.

A

reorganization of the political parties on a countrywide basis
and the government being broad-based should be envisaged.

In

Nigeria there were 312 members in the Federal Legislature as
compared to the 250 officially recognized ethnic groups.
would not matter if the Central Legislature were termed a

It
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Tribal Assembly.

Attempts should be made to contain irreden

tists by nteans o'ther than suppression.

Perhaps a government

and a cabinet in which members of nearly all tribes are repre
. sented could provide the tranqui11izing effect of office
holding among the dissatisfied minorities.
The problems of national unity in African countries are
to a certain extent due to the existence of strong forces of
tradition side by side with modern change.

In view of the

fact that the changes--po1itica1, economic, and socio10gica1-
were brought about by the presence of the European powers
there is a tendency to blame them.

But insofar as the Africans

..

accepted the change towards modernity they share the blame.
1>.s long as the Africans attempt to rely on tradition to cope
with the

moderniz~t:.ion

which they accepted, the problems are

multiplied and the blame becomes diverse.

It does not mean

that the Africans should not preserve their cultural outlook
of the African personality when it is essential to national
progress but they cannot put a new wine i.n an old hide without
a thorough mending.

It also does not mean that the Africans

are to be blind imitators of European ·cultura1 values, but
they should adopt only those values that would bring the
qreatest good to the greatest number.

The European powers

have given the Africans a new economic territorial area and
to transform this territorial i=\rea into
should be the work of the Africans.

Cl

political entity·

It is true that. Nigeria

is a plural society, a multi-state of ancient kingdoms and
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different nationalities all lumped into one territorial sphere
as the result of British influence.

Most European nation

states--Britain, France, Italy and Germany--were artificially
created and they have a semblance of national unity, though
in their case the forces of change did not occur all at the
same time.

The European powers transferred their acquired

experience to the Africans and what was good enough for Europe
was thought good enough for the Africans.

Thus if we blame

the European powers too much we are failing to recognize their
sense of missd.on which allowed them to ignore changes in terms
of time and place.

The Africans must accept part of the blame

so that they can work out better solutions to their problems.
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